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73 
Popular Constitutional Argument 
Tom Donnelly* 
Critics have long attacked popular constitutionalists for offering few 
clues about how their theory might work in practice—especially inside the 
courts. These critics are right. Popular constitutionalism—as a matter of both 
theory and practice—remains a work in progress. In this Article, I take up the 
challenge of developing an account of (what I call) popular constitutional 
argument. Briefly stated, popular constitutional argument is a form of 
argument that draws on the American people’s considered judgments as a 
source of constitutional authority—akin to traditional sources like text, 
history, structure, and doctrine. Turning to constitutional theory, I situate 
popular constitutional argument within contemporary debates over judicial 
restraint, living constitutionalism, popular sovereignty theory, and 
originalism. And turning to constitutional practice, I offer the interpreter a 
concrete framework for crafting popular constitutional arguments—
cataloguing the various indicators of public opinion that have played a role in 
recent Supreme Court decisions. These indicators include measures associated 
with the president, Congress, state and local governments, the American 
people’s actions and traditions, and public opinion polls. Throughout, I use 
illustrative examples to show the various ways in which popular 
constitutional argument already operates at the Supreme Court—appealing to 
jurists from across the ideological spectrum. While this Article begins to 
explore how popular constitutionalism might operate inside the courts, much 
work remains. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Popular constitutionalism is simple to describe in theory, but 
difficult to apply in practice. In theory, it is a gloss on America’s rule 
of recognition—popular sovereignty.1 This concept is central to 
 
 1. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 74 (2d ed. 1994) (considering the American 
electorate as an “extraordinary and ulterior legislature” bound to uphold the Constitution). 
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America’s constitutional self-identity and is captured by some of the 
central phrases in the American constitutional canon, including the 
Preamble (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and 
establish this Constitution”) and the Gettysburg Address 
(“government of the people, by the people, for the people”).  
In the United States, no single government official or level of 
government is sovereign—not the president, Congress, the Supreme 
Court, the government of New Jersey, or the Mercer County 
Commission.2 Of course, the U.S. Constitution provides a framework 
for government and includes some of the American people’s most 
cherished rights, including free speech and religious liberty. The 
Constitution also includes a formal amendment process. For the 
Founding Generation, this mechanism ensured that the American 
people could update their charter in a regular, orderly way—
correcting deficiencies, big and small, without recourse to violence or 
revolution. 
Many contemporary interpretive debates turn on how best to 
read the Constitution’s text as it exists. For instance, what sorts of 
laws violate the First Amendment’s protections for free speech or 
religious liberty? How broadly does Article I’s commerce power sweep? 
And what activities can the president carry out unilaterally under 
Article II’s commander-in-chief power? These are important 
interpretive disputes, and they often turn on which sources of 
authority America’s rule of recognition identifies.  
However, some disputes are more fundamental still—with 
scholars debating whether the written Constitution remains the 
ultimate source of constitutional authority or whether courts (and 
officials) should recognize acts of popular sovereignty outside of it. 
Most dramatically, these extraconstitutional acts might include a new 
American Revolution—overthrowing the existing Constitution and 
replacing it with a new one. However, these theoretical (and 
historical) debates often turn on actions taken within the existing 
constitutional system, transforming the Constitution’s meaning 
outside of the formal Article V amendment process—often through 
social movements, elections, public debates, judicial appointments, 
landmark statutes, and transformative Supreme Court opinions. 
For popular constitutionalists (and their key forerunners like 
Bruce Ackerman), the core issue is popular sovereignty itself. For 
these theorists, the key practical issue is how best to identify when the 
 
 2. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–36 (1999) (“[N]o organ of the government is 
authorized to speak in the name of the people.”).  
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American people have spoken, determine what they have said, and 
figure out how best to apply the American people’s commands in 
concrete cases. In short, while Americans have long valued the role of 
the Supreme Court in our constitutional system, popular 
constitutionalists argue that the American people must play a central 
role in constitutional development. 
Even so, criticisms of popular constitutionalism abound, and 
they are as obvious as they are plentiful. Some critics attack the 
theory as vague.3 Others as meaningless.4 And still others as 
dangerous.5 Each set of criticisms raises its own set of challenges for 
popular constitutionalism. 
Two questions remain: Can popular constitutionalism survive 
this onslaught by its critics? And if it can, how might the theory work 
in practice? 
Popular constitutionalism is often associated with the most 
virulently anti-court rhetoric of its proponents. For some popular 
constitutionalists, judicial review must go.6 For others, judicial review 
may stay, but, even then, the American people and their elected 
leaders must be prepared to strike back against an aggressive 
Supreme Court—at times, using blunt court-curbing measures like 
jurisdiction stripping and court packing.7 This version of popular 
constitutionalism—though frequently discussed—has managed to 
attract few adherents due to its fixation with the Supreme Court and 
judicial overreach. But courts could actually play a constructive role in 
realizing popular sovereignty today. Judicial popular 
constitutionalism is one way of making popular constitutionalism 
work.8  
Even when popular constitutionalists turn to the courts for 
help, challenges remain. For instance, how might a popular 
constitutionalist interpret the Constitution? Should she rely on 
 
 3. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 656 
(2005) (book review) (arguing that popular constitutionalist Larry Kramer failed to identify how 
his theory might work in practice). 
 4. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1621 (2005) (book review) (“The idea that the people themselves are a 
corporate body or organic unity is a fiction.”). 
 5. Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular 
Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 690 (“Popular constitutionalism’s central flaw is its 
failure to recognize that the protection of minorities and their rights cannot rely on the 
majority.”). 
 6. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154 (1999). 
 7. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 249 (2004). 
 8. See Tom Donnelly, Judicial Popular Constitutionalism, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 541 
(2015) (book review). 
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judicial restraint?9 Moments of heightened popular sovereignty?10 The 
results of the most recent opinion poll? Patterns of popular lawmaking 
at the national, state, and local levels?11 The specific contours of 
popular constitutional analysis remain underexplored, but some 
scholars have made a start.  
One strand of scholarship discusses the normative tradeoffs of 
using public opinion as an explicit part of constitutional analysis.12 
For instance, Richard Primus argues, “[T]he strongly held view of the 
public is sometimes an ingredient of the right answer to a 
constitutional question, just like text, precedent, history, structure, 
social science, and normative theory.”13 While conceding that popular 
authority remains “controversial” within constitutional theory, Primus 
adds that this form of analysis may promote important values like 
“democracy, the rule of law, and public identification with the 
regime.”14 At the same time, Primus acknowledges that popular 
constitutional analysis still awaits a comprehensive framework (and 
defense).15 
Another strand of scholarship studies the relationship between 
the Supreme Court, the elected branches, and the American people.16 
 
 9. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
 10. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
 11. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945 
(2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism]; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 
1032 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Departmentalism]. 
 12. See Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by 
Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215 (2007); Richard Primus, Double-
Consciousness in Constitutional Adjudication, 13 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 2–3 (2007) [hereinafter 
Primus, Double-Consciousness]; Richard Primus, Response, Public Consensus as Constitutional 
Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2010) [hereinafter Primus, Public Consensus].  
 13. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 2. 
 14. Id. at 7, 9. 
 15. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1218 (conceding that he has been 
unable to offer a “complete exposition of this perspective”); see also Coan, supra note 12, at 237 
(describing his own account as a “preliminary sketch”). 
 16. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD 1 (2011) (exploring the “attitude members of the public must have toward the 
constitutional project in order for it to be legitimate”); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE 
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE 
COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–83 (2001); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1345 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, De Facto]; Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: 
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) 
[hereinafter Siegel, Dead] (discussing two possible explanations for the Heller decision, each of 
which turns on the opinions of the American public in a different era).  
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These scholars argue that the Supreme Court’s decisions often track 
public opinion—whether because of the Supreme Court nomination 
process, social movement activism, public challenges to the Court’s 
authority, court-curbing measures in Congress, or changes in the 
attitudes of the Justices themselves. This scholarship establishes that 
public opinion may exert some control on constitutional doctrine over 
time—often indirectly. However, work remains to explore popular 
constitutional argument as a matter of explicit constitutional practice 
and to determine whether (and when) it may be an appropriate source 
of authority in the courts. 
Finally, still another strand does describe the Supreme Court’s 
use of public opinion as an explicit part of its decisionmaking 
process.17 For instance, Corinna Barrett Lain’s pioneering work 
explores the areas in which the Supreme Court has explicitly taken 
public opinion into account in constitutional doctrine through the use 
of state legislation counts—in other words, through “evolving 
standards” defined by the state laws on the books.18 However, no 
scholar has yet attempted to disaggregate the various forms of popular 
constitutional argument and show how they function—often in 
tandem—as part of constitutional practice. State legislation counting 
is an important form of popular constitutional argument; however, it 
is only one form among many available to the popular constitutional 
interpreter. 
In this Article, I seek to take up both the descriptive and 
normative challenges of developing an account of (what I call) popular 
constitutional argument. Briefly stated, popular constitutional 
argument is an argument that draws on the American people’s 
considered judgments as a form of authority for reaching a given 
constitutional conclusion. By “considered judgment,” I mean 
something approaching a popular constitutional consensus—one that 
unites the American people and is the product of deliberation and 
debate.19 This type of constitutional argument takes many different 
forms as a matter of constitutional practice, but the source of 
authority—the considered judgments of the American people—
remains the same.  
 
 17. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT (2008). 
 18. Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 
365, 401 (2009). 
 19. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the American people’s considered judgment on a 
given issue as a “popular constitutional consensus.” However, I also take seriously Justin 
Driver’s argument that constitutional historians often oversimplify constitutional consensus. See 
Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755 (2011). 
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Throughout, I take as my model Philip Bobbitt’s influential 
account of conventional constitutional arguments.20 Building from 
Bobbitt, I explore the use of popular constitutional argument in theory 
and practice. While Primus is right that popular constitutional 
argument remains controversial among many lawyers and scholars,21 
I place these arguments in context and show how they have been used 
in the courts as a form of constitutional reasoning akin to other 
traditional sources of legal authority like text, history, structure, 
doctrine, and prudence. I suggest that what may be missing as a 
matter of constitutional theory and methodology is evident in 
constitutional practice. 
Of course, popular constitutional argument is in tension with 
traditional conceptions of judicial review as a safeguard against 
majoritarian tyranny.22 This is especially true in the case of minority-
protective provisions, such as the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause. In addition, recourse to “the People” is vague and 
subject to abuse: it is another means by which judges can draw on 
external sources of authority to promote their own notions of superior 
policymaking and moral judgment.23 And yet, popular constitutional 
consensus is sometimes a useful corrective for representative 
deficiencies in the elected branches.24 As early as the Marshall Court, 
in one of the first Supreme Court blockbusters, the Court itself rested 
its decision on “settled . . . public opinion.”25 
In this Article, I explore the challenges of applying popular 
constitutionalism in the courts and then build a framework for 
understanding and using popular constitutional argument in practice. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I attempt to bring some 
coherence to the popular constitutionalism literature, explore the 
various criticisms of the theory, and offer some tentative responses. In 
Part II, I introduce popular constitutional argument and situate it 
within the broader constitutional theory literature, including 
 
 20. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). 
 21. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 7. 
 22. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 690. 
 23. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1623 (“You can call a court ‘The People’s Court’ 
or a mob ‘The People’s Army,’ but fancy names cannot transform new government institutions 
into the people themselves.”). 
 24. See Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 61 DRAKE L. 
REV. 989, 992–93 (2013) (discussing the realignment of political parties during the twentieth 
century and resultant legislative difficulties in the early twenty-first century); Corinna Barrett 
Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 148–52 (2012) (discussing functional and 
political impediments to majoritarian change). 
 25. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 32 (1812). 
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contemporary debates over judicial restraint, living constitutionalism, 
popular sovereignty theory, and originalism. 
In Part III, I explore popular constitutional argument in 
practice, cataloguing the forms of popular constitutional argument—in 
other words, the indicators of public opinion that have played a role in 
recent constitutional practice at the Supreme Court. These indicators 
include measures associated with the president, Congress, state and 
local governments, the American people’s actions and traditions, and 
public opinion polls. In Part IV, I consider how to craft popular 
constitutional arguments, including some of the factors that make 
strong (and weak) ones—most notably, patterns of constitutional 
convergence (and divergence), related historical narratives, levels of 
deliberation, and evidence of interbranch custom. I also explore the 
relationship between popular constitutionalism and precedent. 
Finally, in Part V, I end with a case study—the Supreme Court’s 
recent landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges26—placing popular 
constitutional argument in dialogue with Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent. 
In the end, my goal is not to offer a comprehensive account of 
every instance of popular constitutional argument at the Supreme 
Court or to provide a full-throated defense of this form of argument as 
the best way to interpret the Constitution. Instead, I seek to use 
illustrative examples to show the various ways in which this form of 
argument has operated at the Court and appealed to jurists from 
across the ideological spectrum, warts and all. 
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS  
(AND THERE ARE MANY!) 
Popular constitutionalism has spawned a sprawling literature 
and a wide range of critics. Before building an account of popular 
constitutional argument, it is useful to first map the various strands of 
popular constitutionalism and then highlight key criticisms of the 
larger theory.  
Critics raise many legitimate objections to popular 
constitutionalism—many of which inform the account of popular 
constitutional argument that follows. Nevertheless, the theory can 
survive this critical onslaught. 
 
 26. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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A. The Varieties of Popular Constitutionalism 
Broadly speaking, it is possible to separate popular 
constitutionalism into two branches: one descriptive and the other 
normative. The descriptive literature explores the relationship 
between the Supreme Court, the elected branches, social movements, 
and public opinion.27 Many of these works build from Robert Dahl’s 
keen insight decades ago that “the policy views dominant on the Court 
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among 
the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”28 
Some of this scholarship brings together political scientists and 
legal scholars, examining the American people’s views on specific 
constitutional issues and their support for different constitutional 
methodologies.29 Other strands include works of constitutional history, 
studying how the Constitution outside the courts (e.g., social 
movements, elected officials, political parties, and the general public) 
influences decisionmaking inside the courts, whether through 
entrepreneurial lawyering, political threats, landmark statutes, 
judicial appointments, court-curbing measures, or larger trends in 
public opinion.30 Some of these historical narratives are sanguine, 
highlighting how popular constitutional views filter into Supreme 
Court decisionmaking.31 Others are pessimistic, arguing that the 
twentieth century witnessed the triumph of judicial supremacy.32 
While Larry Kramer looks to constitutional history to tell a 
story of popular constitutional decline, much of this descriptive 
literature seeks to establish that constitutional doctrine does not 
 
 27. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 16. 
 28. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). 
 29. See PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 
2008); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2598 
(2003); Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True 
Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 901 (2005); Jamal Greene et al., Profiling 
Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 361 (2011).  
 30. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 16, at 1; FRIEDMAN, supra note 16; KRAMER, supra note 7; 
ROSEN, supra note 16; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 16, at 1066–83; Joseph Blocher, Response, 
Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 108 
(2011); Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 197 (2013); 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1609 (2017); Jedediah Purdy, 
Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837 (2009); Siegel, De Facto, 
supra note 16, at 1345; Siegel, Dead, supra note 16, at 192. But see Lawrence Baum & Neal 
Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 
1516 (2010) (arguing that elite opinion matters more to the Justices than the views of the 
American people as a whole). 
 31. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 16, at 2; FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 374–85; ROSEN, 
supra note 16, at 4. 
 32. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 214–15, 249. 
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impose elite judicial values on the rest of the country, but instead 
tracks public opinion over time—especially on the constitutional 
issues most important to the American people.33 In the end, this 
descriptive work has done much to explain why doctrine often tracks 
public opinion. 
The normative literature—probably the most visible (and 
certainly the most criticized) of the popular constitutionalism 
scholarship—argues that the American people must have the ultimate 
authority over constitutional meaning. These accounts are largely 
characterized by attacks on the Supreme Court and judicial 
supremacy.34 Normative popular constitutionalists fear that the 
American people have lost their confidence as constitutional 
interpreters and that the Supreme Court has seized power.35 In the 
process, the American people have lost their capacity for self-
governance and delegated constitutional decisionmaking to elite 
lawyers.36 In response, this scholarship often explores possible 
remedies, focusing on pathways of institutional reform.  
The most radical theorists argue for an end to judicial review.37 
Others promote blunt court-curbing measures like court packing and 
jurisdiction stripping.38 In previous work, I have sought a middle 
ground: an approach that respects the value of legal consensus, while 
offering a popular check on bare majoritarian decisionmaking at the 
Supreme Court—what I call “the People’s veto,” the popular 
 
 33. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 14 (“On issue after contentious issue—abortion, 
affirmative action, gay rights, and the death penalty to name a few—the [modern] Supreme 
Court has rendered decisions that meet with popular approval and find support in the latest 
Gallup Poll.”); ROSEN, supra note 16, at 3 (“On a range of issues during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
moderate majority on the Supreme Court represented the views of a majority of Americans more 
accurately than the polarized party leadership in Congress.”). 
 34. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 247–48 (arguing the American people should “lay 
claim to the Constitution” and “publicly repudiat[e] Justices who say that they, not we, possess 
ultimate authority to say what the Constitution means”). 
 35. See, e.g., RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE”: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST 
MANIFESTO 71–73 (1994); Larry D. Kramer, Lecture, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, 
Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 
697 (2006) (“Today, we have for all practical purposes turned the Constitution over to the 
Supreme Court.”); Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 991, 991 (2006). 
 36. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 7–8 (“Law is set aside for a trained elite of judges 
and lawyers whose professional task is to implement the formal decisions produced in and by 
politics.”). 
 37. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 154. 
 38. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 249 (“Justices can be impeached, the Court’s budget 
can be slashed, the President can ignore its mandates, Congress can strip it of jurisdiction or 
shrink its size or pack it with new members or give it burdensome new responsibilities or revise 
its procedures.”); Kramer, supra note 35, at 748 (discussing the use of such measures throughout 
American history). 
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reconsideration of constitutional decisions.39 (I haven’t found any 
takers, either!) Given these blunt remedies, it is little wonder that 
popular constitutionalism has faced widespread criticism.40 
Finally, another set of scholars, sometimes styling themselves 
“democratic constitutionalists,” has offered a friendly addendum to 
popular constitutionalism. This scholarship—associated, most 
prominently, with Robert Post and Reva Siegel—responds to specific 
efforts by the Supreme Court to cut back on Congress’s authority 
under the Reconstruction Amendments’ Enforcement Clauses.41 
Rather than calling for court curbing or an end to judicial review, Post 
and Siegel offer a defense of robust congressional enforcement 
powers—a means of promoting constitutional dialogue between 
Congress, the courts, and the American people.42  
What—if anything—unites these various strands of popular 
constitutionalism? As I have argued elsewhere, popular 
constitutionalists are united by a “populist sensibility”—a shared 
belief that popular constitutional consensus should shape 
contemporary constitutional meaning.43 Even so, criticisms of popular 
constitutionalism abound. 
 
 39. Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 162. 
For other efforts in a similar mold, see Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular 
Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 973 (2010) (proposing that 
judicial review take place only at the trial court level); and Stephen Gardbaum, The New 
Commonwealth Model, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 710 (2001) (evaluating the new commonwealth 
model of constitutionalism). For a classic account of constitutional amendment outside of Article 
V, see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
 40. For an incomplete list of Kramer’s critics, see Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1594; 
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 675; Neal Devins, The D’oh! of Popular Constitutionalism, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1341 (2019); William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth 
Century: Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the 
Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 967, 968 (2006); Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of The People Themselves 
and Popular Constitutionalism, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813, 813 (2006); Hulsebosch, supra note 3, 
at 656; Robert Kaczorowski, Popular Constitutionalism Versus Justices in Plainclothes: 
Reflections from History, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1438 (2005); L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” 
Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 857 (2005) (book review); 
Lawrence G. Sager, Courting Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2005); and Suzanna 
Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 461, 463 (2009).  
 41. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–8 (2003); Post & Siegel, 
Departmentalism, supra note 11, at 1029; Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra 
note 11, at 1945–47; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Roe Rage]. 
 42. See Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 41, at 379. 
 43. Donnelly, supra note 39, at 161. 
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B. Popular Constitutionalism’s Critics 
Critics have attacked popular constitutionalism since its 
inception on a variety of fronts. The theory’s first problem is 
conceptual. Popular constitutionalists remain divided over many 
fundamental issues. For instance, they disagree over what to do with 
judicial review. Some wish to preserve it.44 Others wish to abolish it.45 
And for scholars open to preserving judicial review (especially those 
like Larry Kramer, who remain critical of judicial overreach46), the 
question remains how best to reap the benefits of judicial review while 
minimizing the dangers of judicial supremacy. 
Popular constitutionalists also disagree on constitutional 
history. Some argue that the countermajoritarian difficulty is no 
difficulty at all and that the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions 
tend to track public opinion.47 Others counter that the Supreme Court 
has increased its power over time and that the American people and 
their elected officials have acquiesced to judicial supremacy.48 These 
competing narratives lead to radically different normative 
prescriptions. Given these conceptual issues, one might even question 
whether there is a distinct (and coherent) popular constitutionalism 
literature at all.  
Even if we grant that popular constitutionalism means 
(constitutional) power to the people, this vision raises its own set of 
problems, beginning with a simple (but difficult) one: Who are the 
people, and how do we know if they have spoken?49 Some critics argue 
that this challenge dooms popular constitutionalism from the start.50  
For these critics, the American people do not exist as such, and 
they certainly do not speak with a clear voice. As a result, any attempt 
to divine the public’s views is simply too subjective an exercise.51 How 
should we define public opinion for purposes of constitutional 
decisionmaking? Should we look to public opinion polls, the positions 
of the leading political parties, the results of recent elections, the 
 
 44. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 253 (concluding that retaining judicial review but 
abolishing judicial supremacy would strike the correct balance).  
 45. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 154–76; Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348 (2006). 
 46. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 247–48. 
 47. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 374–76. 
 48. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 7. 
 49. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 112. 
 50. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1621 (“From the founding era to today, the 
people have been too numerous and diverse to speak with a single voice.”). 
 51. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 
YALE L.J. 664, 691 (2017) (book review). 
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activities of social movements, mechanisms of direct democracy, or 
laws at the federal, state, and local levels? And what level of public 
consensus does popular constitutionalism require on an issue?52 A 
mere majority? A supermajority? Near unanimity? There is no set 
answer to these questions.  
And even if we do settle these preliminary issues, there is still 
the question of measurement and implementation. For popular 
constitutionalism to work, we must have institutions capable of 
channeling the American people’s constitutional views.53 However, all 
institutions are flawed. Each raises its own principal-agent 
problems.54 For instance, elected officials may act without a genuine 
popular mandate55 by following a narrow agenda that serves only a 
small (but powerful) faction56 or acting to aggrandize their own power 
at the expense of the public interest.57 Furthermore, with no single 
institution perfectly reflecting public opinion at the national level, 
political actors—whether elected officials, movement leaders, or 
interest groups—will each claim to speak for the American people.58  
During times of ordinary politics, these concerns may be fairly 
innocuous and ultimately settled by some combination of public 
discourse, elections, and court cases. However, in their most extreme 
form, these concerns—which date at least as far back as Carl 
Schmitt59—provide a means for populist leaders to claim the authority 
to speak for the “real” people of the nation,60 apart from (and in the 
face of) empirical or institutional expressions of the public’s will to the 
 
 52. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1777–82 (2011). 
 53. Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1621; see Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 691 
(discussing the inadequacy of such channeling). 
 54. Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1622–23 (“Once popular will is given institutional 
form, we simply have another group of officials, thus giving rise to the same agency problems 
that motivate the call for popular constitutionalism.”). 
 55. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2004) (noting that “public officials have no mandate, accountability, or 
democratic mechanism for expression of public ‘constitutional’ will”). 
 56. See id. (“Legislatures are heavily influenced by vested, special interests . . . .”) 
 57. Cf. Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1637 (arguing that the judiciary serves as a 
mechanism of “popular enforcement of the Constitution against blatant usurpations of authority” 
by political actors); Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1015. 
 58. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 690 (explaining that “absent univocal sovereign 
action,” public actors will “appeal[ ] to the original and continuing constitutional authority of the 
people”). 
 59. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 27 (2016); Christoph Möllers, “We Are 
(Afraid of) the People”: Constituent Power in German Constitutionalism, in THE PARADOX OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 87, 104 (Martin Loughlin 
& Neil Walker eds., 2007) (noting Carl Schmitt’s contributions to popular constitutionalism). 
 60. See MÜLLER, supra note 59, at 101. 
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contrary.61 This is the danger of popular sovereignty without proper 
institutional mechanisms.62 Unfortunately, all institutions suffer a 
similar flaw. They are not the people—just imperfect reflections of 
them. But criticisms of popular constitutionalism do not stop there.  
Even if we bracket these institutional concerns, and even if we 
measure and implement the public’s current views correctly, it is still 
fair to ask whether the public’s views are even worth following. For 
many critics of popular constitutionalism, this is the central flaw of 
the theory—not the institutions, but the people themselves.63 
This critique turns on some combination of perceived public 
apathy and ignorance. Surveys show that the American people know 
(and care) little about the Constitution’s text and history, the Supreme 
Court itself, or the issues on the Supreme Court’s agenda.64 With little 
interest and little knowledge, the American people may provide judges 
and elected officials with few—if any—popular constitutional 
understandings to implement. Moreover, these low levels of interest 
and knowledge leave any remaining popular constitutional views 
suspect. Critics fear that these views may be the product of elite 
manipulation, not deliberation and debate.65 They question whether 
the American people have the analytical skills, ability to weigh 
competing claims, and capacity for long-term thinking necessary to 
form proper constitutional conclusions.66 
And even when individuals do reach considered judgments on 
an issue, there is still no guarantee that the American public as a 
whole will reach anything like a consensus.67 Our society is deeply 
divided on many issues—many of them constitutional ones of great 
salience. When the public lacks a consensus, there is simply no 
popular view for institutions to translate into public action.68 
 
 61. See id. at 102 (explaining that populists are “immune to empirical refutation” because 
they often try to “play off the ‘real people’ or ‘silent majority’ against elected representatives and 
the official outcome of a vote”). 
 62. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 690 (“Lacking the imprimatur of any procedure 
by which the people can be said to have acted in its sovereign capacity, appeals to the 
constitutional demands of a multitude are always susceptible to charges of opportunism and self-
serving interpretation.”). 
 63. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 241–42 (describing the “Anti-Populist” critique of 
popular constitutionalism). 
 64. Devins, supra note 40, at 1340; Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1222; 
Michael Serota, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1635, 1656–59 (2012). 
 65. See Gewirtzman, supra note 29, at 899 (“Moreover, popular interpretive opinions are 
often based on limited information, and are highly susceptible to manipulation by elites.”). 
 66. Serota, supra note 64, at 1659. 
 67. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 3. 
 68. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1623 (discussing the low likelihood that the 
public could come to a consensus on even a simple constitutional question). 
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Furthermore, even when the public does reach a consensus, it may be 
difficult to determine whether they’ve reached a constitutional 
consensus rather than one based on policy or morality.69 Finally, even 
if the American people have reached a constitutional consensus and 
public officials can implement it, there is still the greatest danger of 
all: the threat of majoritarian tyranny. 
This concern turns on widespread fear of the repressive 
tendencies of the American people themselves.70 For these critics, the 
Constitution is designed to restrict the majority’s will, limit 
governmental power, and protect individual rights.71 Judicial review 
serves these purposes by enforcing constitutional limits;72 popular 
constitutionalism risks subverting them.73 These critics leverage the 
judiciary’s (perceived) institutional advantages—whether that’s the 
judiciary’s political insulation74 or capacity for principled reasoning.75 
These critics also agree that the Constitution’s meaning should not 
fluctuate with public opinion76—or, even worse, bend to the public’s 
will during times of emergency. For these critics, popular 
constitutionalism threatens constitutionalism itself. 
Of course, popular constitutionalists like Larry Kramer tell 
happy stories of powerful presidents and the American people 
standing together to check an evil (or ignorant) Supreme Court. But 
the American people (and their elected leaders) sometimes err.77 
Sometimes the people themselves (and their elected leaders)—and not 
the Supreme Court—promote constitutional evil, with the Supreme 
Court playing a mere supporting role (think, for example, of the 
collapse of Reconstruction).78 While the courts are far from perfect, 
they offer an additional check when the American people go astray.79 
 
 69. Id.; Devins, supra note 40, at 1341. 
 70. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1025 (arguing that civil liberties and rights “should 
not depend on the wishes of the majority”). 
 71. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1219. 
 72. Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of Ideas, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1067, 1071 (2008) (arguing that “judicial review, robustly practiced, is an indispensable 
mechanism for protecting the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution”). 
 73. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1013 (“Popular constitutionalism would mean that 
courts would be far less available to protect fundamental rights.”). 
 74. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3 (2001) (“What 
distinguishes the justices from the people’s other representatives is their life tenure and their 
consequent disinterestedness, not their legal acumen.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1019 
(advancing the view that while the judiciary is not completely apolitical, “judicial review is not 
the product of lobbying or direct pressure from special interests”). 
 75. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 32, 71 (1985). 
 76. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 7. 
 77. Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1221. 
 78. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877, 930 (1996) (“The abandonment of Reconstruction, and certain of the ‘national security’ 
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Even if the threat of majoritarian tyranny is overstated, 
popular constitutionalism might still undermine constitutional law’s 
settlement function.80 Constitutional issues often divide the American 
people. Judicial review provides a mechanism for settling some of 
these issues and providing some stability and predictability in the 
law.81 Critics fear that popular constitutionalism may lead to 
divergent constitutional conclusions within different governmental 
institutions, leading to conflicts—between the nation and the states, 
and between institutions within each level of government—that 
undermine the rule of law and sow discord throughout American 
society.82 
Finally, returning to popular constitutional argument inside 
the courts, it is worth asking whether the courts can even play a 
constructive role in translating popular constitutional meaning into 
constitutional doctrine. Nothing in a judge’s training suggests that she 
will have any expertise in divining public opinion.83 Even worse, 
popular constitutional argument may give judges a new warrant to 
read their own views into those of the American people, thus providing 
a new avenue for judicial adventurism.84 
Critics have attacked popular constitutionalism on many 
fronts. Before building an account of popular constitutional argument, 
it is important to first offer a (tentative) response to these critics. 
 
excesses of the Cold War era, may be examples of profound and long-lasting changes in popular 
sentiment that judges should have rejected.”).  
 79. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1021 (arguing that court interventions have been 
necessary to end to racial, religious, and political persecution that resulted from “ ‘popular 
constitutionalism,’ but hardly the kind that any of us wants to preserve or promote”). But see 
Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution: Tensions in the 
Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644, 2648 (2014) (noting that courts are powerless to 
provide this check for duly adopted constitutional amendments, even those that would violate 
the American “constitutional identity”).  
 80. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1629 (“The ‘rule of law’ provides very great 
goods, including predictability, certainty, and stability.”). 
 81. See id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1014 (noting the “stabilizing effect of binding 
decisions by the judicial branch”); Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 3, 15 (“Part of 
the aspiration of the rule of law is government by stable, impersonal norms that do not vary with 
passing fads or with the popularity of particular litigants.”). 
 82. See Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1635 (arguing that with popular 
constitutionalism, “[t]he boundaries [of federal power] are unlikely to be crisp,” and Congress is 
unlikely to take effective direction from vague standards such as “necessary and proper”); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1015 (expressing concern over the possibility that popular 
constitutionalism “weaken[s] constitutional limits on the actions of elected and unelected” and 
may create “discordant constitutional interpretations across the branches of the federal 
government and the states”). 
 83. Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 12, at 3, 13. 
 84. Id. at 13. 
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C. The Value of Popular Constitutionalism 
The popular constitutionalism literature includes various 
strands. Even so, the theory’s key proponents coalesce around three 
reasons for valuing popular—as opposed to judicial—meaning. 
First, American constitutional history is dominated by an 
ongoing debate over rights and the proper scope of government. 
Disagreement is pervasive and unavoidable.85 It is not the product of 
duplicity, ignorance, a failure of legal reasoning, or simple prejudice.86 
The Constitution simply raises difficult questions.87 For constitutional 
theorists, the key question is who should be called on to resolve these 
disputes. Popular constitutionalists agree that the American people 
should play an important role in this process.88 
Second, the judiciary does not have a monopoly on 
constitutional wisdom. This rationale often turns on a critique of the 
Supreme Court’s institutional setting and its role in history. For 
instance, some popular constitutionalists argue that the Supreme 
Court’s institutional advantages are often overstated.89 The Justices 
rarely deliberate together about their cases.90 Oral arguments and 
weekly conferences are short.91 The Justices often read little more 
than the parties’ briefs and bench memoranda written by their 
clerks.92 And the Justices’ clerks often write the first draft of the 
Court’s opinions.93 As Kramer concludes, “This does not mean that the 
Justices are not in control, but there is a considerable gap between 
this kind of control and the stories told to justify judicial supremacy.”94 
Popular constitutionalists also look to American history and 
conclude that the Supreme Court has often fallen short of its 
defenders’ expectations.95 These scholars look to decisions like Dred 
Scott v. Sandford,96 Plessy v. Ferguson,97 and Korematsu v. United 
 
 85. Waldron, supra note 45, at 1368. 
 86. KRAMER, supra note 7, at 236. 
 87. Id.; see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 231 (1999) (explaining that 
constitutional rights issues raise “complicated” questions about which even the “best intellects of 
our society” do not agree). 
 88. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 7, at 247–48. 
 89. Id. at 240. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 153. 
 96. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 97. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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States98 and ask whether the courts have actually tried to protect 
minority rights and individual liberties over time.99 Others track 
Gerald Rosenberg’s argument—an argument reinforced by recent 
quantitative scholarship100—that even when courts act, they often fail 
to significantly alter the status quo in the absence of political will or a 
strong constitutional culture.101 In the end, popular constitutionalists 
of many stripes believe that the case for judicial supremacy is 
overstated. 
Third, the American people and their constitutional 
understandings have often transformed doctrine. Popular 
constitutionalists look to our constitutional tradition and argue that it 
teaches a simple, but profound, lesson: constitutional doctrine remains 
open to transformation. As Jack Balkin explains, “Opinions and views 
that were once ‘off-the-wall’ later become orthodox, and the settled 
assumptions of one era become the canonical examples of bad 
interpretation in another.”102 Claims that were frivolous in the 1940s 
or even the 1990s—for example, that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects marriage equality—are now enshrined in constitutional 
doctrine. These transformations often turn on something other than 
mere legal expertise. 
Over time, new constitutional rights take on increased 
prominence. Old principles are applied in new ways. Societal 
developments force us to confront new evils—or to confront old ones 
through a new constitutional lens. Legal reasoning alone is often 
insufficient to address these societal shifts. Responding to societal 
changes, public debates, and shifts in public opinion, the American 
people (and their leaders) often drive constitutional change. In the 
process, popular constitutional actors often expand the “constitutional 
imagination” by offering new ways of reading the Constitution that 
challenge constitutional orthodoxy.103 Following a period of 
deliberation and debate, the Supreme Court often translates these 
new popular readings into official constitutional doctrine. These new 
readings may require a threshold level of constitutional knowledge or 
commitment; however, they often turn on something other than the 
 
 98. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 99. See Waldron, supra note 45, at 1377.  
 100. Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect Constitutional 
Rights, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 293, 297, 309 (2018). 
 101. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 5–6 (1991). 
 102. BALKIN, supra note 16, at 1. 
 103. Martin Loughlin, The Constitutional Imagination, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1, 3, 12–13 (2015). 
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constitutional niceties tested in surveys about the public’s 
knowledge.104  
In the end, even if popular constitutionalists unite around 
these three insights, scholars have still focused little on questions of 
methodology.105  
For a popular constitutionalist like Mark Tushnet, the 
methodological answer is easy. The Supreme Court does not do much 
to promote liberty and equality.106 We have no reason to think that it 
will be any better at promoting these values than the elected 
branches.107 So, let’s just abolish judicial review and focus on enforcing 
the (thin) Constitution through the elected branches. However, for 
those who wish to preserve a role for judges in constitutional disputes, 
the question remains: How does a popular constitutionalist approach 
constitutional interpretation?  
One response might be to simply let the system continue to 
operate as it has been operating for centuries, and the invisible hand 
of public opinion will continue to guide official constitutional doctrine. 
Some popular constitutionalists (for example, Barry Friedman) might 
argue that this is the lesson of history.108 However, popular 
constitutionalists owe judges more guidance than that. While I 
provided some clues about these methodological issues elsewhere,109 
the challenge remains: what does popular constitutional argument 
look like both in theory and in practice? I offer a more complete 
response in the remainder of this Article.  
My goal is to outline an approach to popular constitutional 
argument that is responsive to traditional constitutional theory, 
consistent with well-established constitutional practice, and resonant 
with popular constitutionalism’s various strands—even the anti-court 
account of the theory’s most famous proponent, Larry Kramer. 
Kramer’s work is both descriptive and normative. It is history with 
 
 104. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 11 (arguing that the American people can—and do—
enforce a “thin Constitution,” which includes the Constitution’s “fundamental guarantees of 
equality, freedom of expression, and liberty”). 
 105. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1214 (explaining that even with these 
insights, “the need to answer the normative question about the sources of judicial authority 
remains”); Sherry, supra note 40, at 463 (“It is hard to know how popular constitutionalism 
would work, since few (if any) of its advocates make any concrete suggestions about how to 
implement popular constitutional interpretation.”). 
 106. See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 129–53. 
 107. See id. at 154–76. 
 108. For additional scholarship establishing a link between public opinion and constitutional 
doctrine, see generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); and Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996).  
 109. Donnelly, supra note 8. 
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considerable normative bite. While Kramer attacks the rise of judicial 
supremacy, he does not reject judicial review. His goal is to promote 
deliberative democracy—a system that checks “the fleeting 
passions . . . of the moment,” refines public debate, and enforces the 
American people’s considered views about the Constitution.110 The 
question remains as to how that system might work—especially inside 
the courts.  
II. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT  
IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
In his classic book, Constitutional Fate, Philip Bobbitt draws on 
the “legal grammar that we all share” to derive a set of legitimate 
arguments from constitutional theory and practice.111 Bobbitt explains 
that “the Court hears arguments, reads arguments, and ultimately 
must write arguments, all within certain conventions.”112 However, 
these conventions are far from settled.113 New constitutional 
arguments emerge, and others recede.114 Some become more powerful, 
and others become less persuasive. Building from Bobbitt, I explore 
the use of popular constitutional argument in theory and practice.  
In this Part, I introduce what I mean by popular constitutional 
argument and situate it within ongoing debates in constitutional 
theory, including contemporary debates over judicial restraint, living 
constitutionalism, popular sovereignty theory, and originalism. I turn 
to constitutional practice in Part III. 
A. Popular Constitutional Argument: The Basics 
Popular constitutional argument draws on the American 
people’s views as a form of authority for reaching a given 
constitutional conclusion. However, the popular constitutional 
interpreter does not settle for vague claims of popular authority or a 
single public opinion poll asking a constitutional question. Instead, 
she looks to a series of concrete indicators of public opinion to guide 
her analysis. 
To craft a persuasive popular constitutional argument, the 
interpreter must seek out the American people’s considered 
judgments—not through the bare assertions of a single elected official 
 
 110. Kramer, supra note 35, at 730. 
 111. BOBBITT, supra note 20, at 6. 
 112. Id. at 6–7. 
 113. Id. at 8. 
 114. Id. at 175. 
Donnelly_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:19 AM 
2020] POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 93 
or the results of the most recent Gallup poll, but through a set of 
indicators showing evidence that the American people have reached 
something approaching a popular consensus on a given issue.115 These 
indicators might take a variety of forms, including measures 
associated with the president, Congress, state and local governments, 
the American people’s actions and traditions, and public opinion polls. 
The interpreter might also consider factors such as patterns of 
constitutional convergence (or divergence), related historical 
narratives, levels of deliberation, and evidence of interbranch custom. 
Despite the distinct contours of each specific popular constitutional 
argument, the source of authority remains the same—the considered 
judgments of the American people. 
To make popular constitutional argument work, the interpreter 
will likely need any or all of the following: a textual hook (e.g., the 
Equal Protection Clause), a doctrinal hook (e.g., a suspect class 
meriting heightened scrutiny), and a shift in how the public views the 
world (e.g., the LGBT community is like other groups protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment). The interpreter will then need to look to 
indicators of public opinion to determine whether a new popular 
constitutional consensus has emerged and, if so, how that might 
transform constitutional doctrine (and reinforce—or challenge—the 
interpreter’s own independent constitutional conclusions).  
The interpreter might use popular constitutional consensus in 
a variety of ways. First, she might use it to check the representative 
branches when their laws and actions fail to reflect the public’s 
views—perhaps due to some flaw in the system. Second, she might use 
it to reinforce her own independent constitutional conclusions, check 
some of her own constitutional pathologies, or argue that her 
opponents are making the countermajoritarian difficulty worse. Third, 
she might use it to evaluate existing constitutional doctrine—either as 
a way of legitimating a well-established line of cases, as a way of 
arguing that a particular case should be overturned, or as a way of 
justifying an entirely new doctrinal framework for a given 
constitutional issue. In fact, popular constitutional consensus may be 
especially useful in justifying the persistence of a doctrinal approach 
that is difficult to justify as an original matter but has long since 
become settled (and accepted) law (e.g., the Miranda rule).116 
 
 115. By developing a robust account of popular constitutional argument, I am heeding 
Justice Goldberg’s warning not to leave “judges . . . at large” to decide fundamental rights “in 
light of their personal and private notions.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring). 
116. See infra notes 264–266 and accompanying text.   
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Of course, popular constitutionalism’s critics may be right. The 
American people may know very little about most constitutional 
provisions, issues, and cases.117 And even when the American people 
reach considered judgments at the individual level, high-profile 
constitutional issues often divide the public.118 When the American 
people either hold no view or remain divided, then the interpreter 
must turn to other constitutional arguments—whether that is another 
constitutional modality or even a simple commitment to judicial 
restraint as the next best way of realizing popular judgments.  
Furthermore, even if a public consensus emerges, many other 
questions remain.119 Which indicators of public opinion should the 
interpreter privilege? What threshold of popular support should the 
interpreter require before enforcing popular constitutional 
conclusions? Should the interpreter limit popular constitutional 
argument to certain provisions—for instance, open-ended provisions 
(possibly) tied to unenumerated rights, such as the Ninth Amendment 
or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause? 
Should she exclude minority-protective provisions like the First 
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause? And what sorts of 
popular conclusions should count—explicitly constitutional 
conclusions or a broader range of public views, including policy 
preferences and moral views that bear on the application of key 
constitutional provisions? While I will not be able to resolve all of 
these questions in this Article, I seek to provide a framework for 
beginning to resolve them, both in theory and practice. 
For now, I offer a few preliminary thoughts. To begin, certain 
constitutional provisions and doctrinal tests may be more consistent 
with popular constitutional argument than others. For instance, the 
Constitution’s text includes broadly worded provisions that raise 
questions that could theoretically turn on popular judgments, 
including whether a law is “necessary and proper” (Article I, Section 
8), a “search or seizure” is “unreasonable” (Fourth Amendment), 
government compensation for seized property is “just” (Fifth 
Amendment), a trial is “speedy” (Sixth Amendment), bail or a 
government fine is “excessive” (Eighth Amendment), a punishment is 
“cruel and unusual” (Eighth Amendment), an unenumerated right is 
fundamental (e.g., the Ninth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment), or a Bill of Rights provision should be incorporated 
 
 117. Alexander & Solum, supra note 4, at 1625; Serota, supra note 64, at 1656–59. 
 118. See Hasen, supra note 24, at 992–93 (discussing party realignment in the wake of the 
Civil Rights Movement and its relationship with increasingly polarized political parties).  
 119. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 705. 
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against the states (e.g., Fourteenth Amendment). Similarly, certain 
doctrinal tests might offer a tighter theoretical link to the public’s 
views—most notably, whether a law or governmental practice serves a 
sufficiently “compelling interest” to survive heightened scrutiny. 
In addition, it is possible to distinguish between at least three 
different modes of popular constitutional opinion. First, the public 
might hold direct constitutional views (e.g., a particular practice or 
law is unconstitutional, or a specific constitutional provision means X). 
Second, the public might hold a certain policy view or reach a certain 
moral judgment that might play a role in constitutional reasoning 
(e.g., nearly every state protects an individual’s right to own a gun, or 
recent opinion polls show that a strong majority believes that 
discriminating against the LGBT community is wrong). Third, and 
finally, the public might recognize certain facts on the ground that 
might inform a constitutional issue (e.g., separate schools are 
inherently unequal, or corporate expenditures corrupt the political 
process). 
These different modes of popular constitutional opinion may 
serve different interpretive purposes. Public opinion might supply an 
explicit constitutional judgment. This might include a direct gloss on 
the Constitution’s text (e.g., whether a certain type of search or 
seizure is “unreasonable”), a direct conclusion about a practice’s 
constitutionality (e.g., bans on assault weapons are unconstitutional), 
or a preference for a specific case’s outcome (e.g., the baker should win 
in a case involving a same-sex couple requesting a wedding cake120). 
Alternatively, it might include a policy judgment (e.g., public support 
for bans on gender discrimination in employment) or public 
recognition of new facts on the ground (e.g., racial diversity is 
important to public education), either of which might be relevant to a 
shift in constitutional doctrine. Of course, some interpreters might 
determine that these final examples are too attenuated to justify a 
particular constitutional conclusion. But others may disagree and use 
them as an important source of popular constitutional authority. 
For those interested in making popular constitutional 
argument work, a final—and powerful—objection arises. Can courts 
even do this? Of course, judges are not trained to discern public 
opinion. However, by limiting popular constitutional argument to 
instances of genuine consensus, even interpreters with limited 
training in analyzing public opinion might be able to recognize the 
American people’s considered judgments.121 Furthermore, even if 
 
120.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).  
 121. Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1222. 
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public opinion is arguably more remote from a judge’s legal training 
than another approach, such as constitutional history, judges already 
do draw on indicators of public opinion to aid in their constitutional 
decisionmaking. In this Article, I seek to use these existing patterns of 
constitutional practice to build up a robust account of popular 
constitutional argument. 
B. Popular Constitutionalism and Constitutional Theory 
Before turning to how popular constitutional argument has 
worked in practice, I will first situate it within contemporary debates 
in constitutional theory, including debates over judicial restraint, 
living constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, and originalism. 
1. Judicial Restraint:  
The Elected Branches Are Not “the People” 
Popular constitutional argument is not a simple appeal to 
judicial restraint. Of course, one traditional argument is that the best 
way to realize popular constitutional views is to simply defer to the 
elected branches. This would give the American people, the political 
process, and elected officials the authority and responsibility to debate 
and settle constitutional issues.122 It is no wonder that some popular 
constitutionalism scholarship defends judicial restraint as the primary 
means of addressing constitutional issues.123 
By embracing judicial restraint, popular constitutionalists 
might unite with the work of early, influential constitutional theorists, 
including James Bradley Thayer and Felix Frankfurter.124 However, 
there are limits to judicial restraint as a primary approach to popular 
constitutional argument. To understand these limits, we should first 
return to Thayer’s canonical account and then consider the tradeoffs of 
embracing the elected branches as agents of popular 
constitutionalism. 
In his classic article, Thayer looks to American constitutional 
history to understand the origins of judicial review and how it has 
 
 122. See generally Brad Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 343 (2013) (discussing the implications of the link between judicial restraint and popular 
constitutionalism). 
 123. Id. at 347–50; see Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who Nearly Killed Judicial 
Restraint, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129, 2151–52 (2014) (arguing popular constitutionalism is 
closely related to judicial restraint).  
 124. Snyder, supra note 123, at 2130, 2133 (discussing the work of James Bradley Thayer); 
Snyder, supra note 122, at 345 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s jurisprudence). 
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been applied in practice by American courts.125 From his survey of 
early American history, Thayer derives a rule that advances a strong 
vision of judicial restraint.126 For Thayer, a court cannot simply 
“disregard” an act “as a mere matter of course,—merely because it is 
concluded that upon a just and true construction the law is 
unconstitutional.”127 Instead it can only invalidate it when the state 
legislature has “not merely made a mistake” but has “made a very 
clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational question.”128 
This rule is not a mere call for the courts to rubber-stamp 
legislative acts but instead turns on the respect that is owed the 
legislative branch, its constitutional role, and its professional 
judgment.129 For Thayer, a court risks descending into “a pedantic and 
academic treatment of the texts,” while the ideal state legislator 
combines “a lawyer’s rigor with a statesman’s breadth of view.”130 
Thayer fears that judicial review might weaken this valuable 
perspective.  
For Thayer, judicial review has “a tendency to drive out 
questions of justice and right” from legislatures and to fill legislators’ 
“mind[s] . . . with thoughts of mere legality, of what the [C]onstitution 
allows. And moreover, even in the matter of legality, they have felt 
little responsibility; if we are wrong, they say, the courts will correct 
it.”131 (Later theorists—most notably, Mark Tushnet—take up this 
critique under the label of “judicial overhang.”)132 Thayer’s solution is 
to redeem the legislators’ constitutional responsibility through a 
commitment to judicial restraint—one that leaves many constitutional 
decisions in the legislators’ (and the electorate’s) hands.133 
For those concerned with the countermajoritarian difficulty, 
judicial restraint is a reasonable, if blunt, response. Thayer’s approach 
also limits the dangers of judicial adventurism. However, for the 
popular constitutional interpreter, it may also defer too much to the 
conclusions of the elected branches.  
While judicial review may sometimes serve as a check on the 
elected branches, it may also be used as a tool to promote popular 
 
 125. See Thayer, supra note 9, at 129 (discussing the inferential power of judicial review 
granted to judges by state constitutions prior to the enactment of the Federal Constitution).  
 126. Id. at 143–44. 
 127. Id. at 144. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 136. 
 130. Id. at 138. 
 131. Id. at 155–56. 
 132. TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 57–58. 
 133. Thayer, supra note 9, at 156. 
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sovereignty134 by acting as a corrective for the various democratic 
deficiencies of the elected branches.135 
Of course, one of the pervasive features of our constitutional 
system is its various veto points. To many—including the Framers—
this is not a bug in our system but one of its most important features. 
Federalism divides power between the national government and the 
states. Separation of powers distributes power to three independent 
branches, each with distinct constituencies and terms of office. And 
the system of checks and balances provides each of these sources of 
political authority with the tools to check the other branches. 
However, these tools also restrict majoritarian political action.136 
Modern political trends and practices exacerbate some of these 
countermajoritarian tendencies.  
Our parties are as polarized as ever. Congressional moderates 
are disappearing,137 making compromise more difficult.138 Well-
established institutions like the congressional committee system and 
the Senate filibuster (and its increased use) provide further obstacles 
to majoritarian action.139 And scholars lament other factors that may 
insulate incumbents and loosen our elected branches’ representative 
ties to the American people, including partisan gerrymandering, 
closed primaries, high-dollar political contributions (and spending), 
and special-interest lobbying.140 
Because of these countermajoritarian factors, the elected 
branches often struggle to pass legislation that matches the 
majoritarian preferences of the electorate.141 At the same time, public 
opinion often outpaces legislation, and legislatures struggle to repeal 
old, unrepresentative laws.142 As a result, old laws may survive for a 
range of reasons, including enduring support, a crowded legislative 
agenda, widespread indifference, or ongoing political paralysis.143 
More broadly, critics see a political system dominated by legislative 
 
 134. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 192, 289. 
 135. Hasen, supra note 24, at 992–93. 
 136. Lain, supra note 24, at 115–16. 
 137. See Hasen, supra note 24, at 992–93. 
 138. NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE 
DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2d ed. 2016); Hasen, supra note 24, at 993. 
 139. Hasen, supra note 24, at 993, 1010; Lain, supra note 24, at 148. 
 140. See Chemerinsky, supra note 55, at 1015; Hasen, supra note 24, at 1009; Lain, supra 
note 24, at 115–16, 148–52. Scholars still debate the power of these forces, but they remain a 
concern of many. 
 141. Devins, supra note 40, at 1338; Lain, supra note 24, at 157.  
 142. Lain, supra note 18, at 403–04; see Lain, supra note 24, at 173 (“Legislation is not 
always the most reliable evidence of contemporary values. Sometimes it is not reliable at all.”).  
 143. See Lain, supra note 18, at 404. 
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gridlock and partisan pandering—with elected officials often catering 
to extremist base voters to avoid party primaries, not looking to 
promote the public good or the views of a majority of their constituents 
(or even their own best independent judgment on a given issue).144 
With a system overrun by these problems, judicial review 
might offer a partial remedy. If political inaction merely reflects a 
divided public with no consensus on an issue, then this is not a 
problem for popular constitutionalism. There is simply no popular 
action for the elected branches to take. However, in other instances, 
popular constitutional argument provides a way of using judicial 
review to correct some of the deficiencies of the representative 
branches. 
Recent scholarship suggests that unelected judges often do an 
effective job promoting majoritarian preferences through judicial 
review.145 As Corinna Barrett Lain explains, “Supreme Court decision 
making is relatively fluid; the Court can change the status quo 
whenever a majority of the Justices decide to do so.”146 This may lead 
the Supreme Court to strike down a law passed by a previous majority 
(as with the Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor)—
one supported by a large enough number of elected officials to block 
legislative repeal, but also opposed by a majority of the American 
people.147 It may also lead the Court to strike down outlier laws in the 
states.148 
Even so, some influential popular constitutionalists—most 
prominently, Mark Tushnet—may still want to abolish judicial review 
and leave constitutional questions to the elected branches.149 For these 
scholars, judicial review is simply not worth the trouble and it would 
be better to take the Constitution away from the courts. However, 
even important Supreme Court skeptics like Larry Kramer preserve a 
role for the courts within a system of popular constitutionalism. These 
scholars are less interested in checking the Court than in realizing the 
American people’s considered judgments. From this perspective, 
simple judicial restraint may not be enough.  
 
 144. Lain, supra note 24, at 152. 
 145. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 14–15 (noting that Supreme Court decisions often 
converge with public opinion); Lain, supra note 24, at 117 (arguing that unelected, majoritarian 
courts may check the elected, nonmajoritarian branches through judicial review).  
 146. Lain, supra note 24, at 157. 
 147. See 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 148. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 246, 247 (2008). 
 149. TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 154. 
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For these scholars, when the elected branches fail and a 
popular constitutional consensus exists, the Court may step in to 
enforce popular constitutional views—especially if the perceived 
deficiencies of the elected branches outweigh legitimate concerns 
about the judiciary’s competence in discerning public opinion. While 
this move may not completely resolve Thayer’s and Tushnet’s concerns 
about judicial overhang, judicial review remains one way of realizing 
the constitutional views of the American people. 
2. Living Constitutionalism:  
Popular Constitutional Argument Is More than a Feeling 
Living constitutionalism and popular constitutionalism bear a 
resemblance to one another across many dimensions. Both theories 
believe that constitutional doctrine should remain in line with 
contemporary values. Both may call on judges to play a role in 
translating these values into constitutional doctrine. And both 
approaches are undertheorized; indeed, critics attack them as vague 
and incoherent. At the same time, these two projects are distinct in 
important ways. To understand how and why, we must first construct 
a coherent account of living constitutionalism—a synthesis that is 
lacking in the existing literature.  
Living constitutionalists are methodologically pluralist, often 
drawing on the full set of traditional constitutional arguments: text, 
history, structure, doctrine, prudence, and ethos.150 When interpreting 
the Constitution, many living constitutionalists are also candid about 
drawing on their own sense of fairness and good social policy.151 
Finally, while methodologically eclectic, these theorists tend to share a 
common goal—to promote a vision of the Constitution that 
“keep[s] . . . in touch with contemporary values,”152 “adapts to 
changing times,”153 and “update[s] and [re]affirm[s]” the Constitution’s 
text in a normatively attractive way for each generation.154 
 
 150. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 143–
51 (1996); William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living 
Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358 (2007).  
 151. See Brennan, supra note 150, at 437 (acknowledging the “substantive value choices” 
made by the Founders and the need to for every generation to update them to fit new values); 
Leib, supra note 150, at 361 (arguing that living constitutionalists take into account “discussions 
of consequences” and “underlying principles of political morality” when interpreting the 
Constitution). 
 152. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 569 (2006). 
 153. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 277 (2011). 
 154. Leib, supra note 150, at 359. 
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For critics, living constitutionalism’s methodological eclecticism 
fails to provide judges with concrete guidance on how to decide 
individual cases. Instead, living constitutionalist judges can simply 
read their own values into the Constitution.155 This is a powerful 
critique—but its overall strength depends on the specifics of the 
interpreter’s approach to living constitutionalism. The existing 
literature suggests two ways of “keeping” constitutional doctrine “in 
touch with contemporary values.” Both have roots in Justice 
Brennan’s canonical defense of the theory.  
The first approach is the most familiar one: living 
constitutionalism as independent judicial decisionmaking. Channeling 
Robert Jackson, Justice Brennan connects this approach with the 
traditional view that “the very purpose of our Constitution—and 
particularly of the Bill of Rights”—was “to declare certain values 
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities.”156 
In other words, the independent judge should apply the Constitution’s 
text in ways consistent with her own (elite) values—often to protect 
minorities from majoritarian abuses. In this account, her 
constitutional authority is tied to her duty as a judge, her professional 
training as a lawyer, and a vision of elite lawyers as defenders of our 
most cherished constitutional values.157 These living constitutionalist 
interpretations will often contradict the constitutional views of the 
community. This approach is not consistent with popular 
constitutional argument. 
Justice Brennan offers the powerful (and controversial) 
example of his conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitutional, 
an approach, he concedes, “to which a majority of my fellow Justices—
not to mention, it would seem, a majority of my fellow countrymen—
does not subscribe.”158 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan embraces the 
role of judge as living constitutionalist prophet: 
[W]hen a Justice perceives an interpretation of the text to have departed so far from its 
essential meaning, that Justice is bound, by a larger constitutional duty to the 
community, to expose the departure and point toward a different path. On this issue, 
 
 155. See BALKIN, supra note 153, at 277–78; J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-
GOVERNANCE 11 (2012); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. 
REV. 693, 693 (1976). See also Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1737, 1755 (2007) (arguing that living constitutionalists “sometimes use more abstract 
texts . . . as a springboard for elitist efforts to revolutionize American values”).  
 156. Brennan, supra note 150, at 436. 
 157. See WALDRON, supra note 87, at 244 (“Instead of empowering the people on the grounds 
that it is . . . their rights that are at stake, we might instead entrust final authority to a scholarly 
or judicial elite, on the ground that they are more likely to get the matter right.”).  
 158. Brennan, supra note 150, at 444. 
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the death penalty, I hope to embody a community, although perhaps [one that has] not 
yet arrived, striving for human dignity for all.159 
Justice Brennan’s approach is a familiar form of living 
constitutionalism and one with many supporters in the legal academy, 
political branches, and general public. 
The second approach—living constitutionalism as community 
values—looks to construe the Constitution’s text in ways that are 
consistent with the evolving values that actually exist among the 
American people. This approach is meant to respond to the dead-hand 
problem.160 
Returning to Justice Brennan, even he concedes that “[t]he 
Constitution cannot be for me simply a contemplative haven for 
private moral reflection.”161 Instead, as a Justice, he must “speak” for 
his “community” and not for himself “alone.”162 As a result, “[t]he act 
of interpretation must be undertaken with full consciousness that it is, 
in a very real sense, the community’s interpretation that is sought”—
not the mere “personal moral predilections” of the interpreter.163 This 
approach to living constitutionalism is consistent with popular 
constitutional argument—even if Justice Brennan himself does not 
offer any details for how a judge might go about discerning the 
“community’s interpretation.” Sympathetic living constitutionalists 
might draw on popular constitutional argument to fill this interpretive 
gap.164 
In the end, David Strauss offers today’s most sophisticated 
account of living constitutionalism—one that incorporates both 
strands of the theory. Strauss’s approach builds from constitutional 
practice and seeks to constrain judges through a form of common-law 
constitutional reasoning.165 
For Strauss, the Constitution’s text constrains at times, but 
constitutional practice is dominated by judges wrestling with 
 
 159. Id.  
 160. See, e.g., Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 195–98 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) 
(introducing the “dead hand” problem). 
 161. Brennan, supra note 150, at 433. 
 162. Id. at 434. 
 163. Id. at 434–35. 
 164. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 307 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing 
the Constitution as “a living Constitution” and arguing that a conviction under Texas’s “three-
strikes” law should have been thrown out based on his own sense of the community’s judgment—
namely, that “[t]he sentence imposed upon the petitioner would be viewed as grossly unjust by 
virtually every layman and lawyer”). 
 165. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) [hereinafter STRAUSS, LIVING 
CONSTITUTION]; Strauss, supra note 78; David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional 
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, Irrelevance]. 
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doctrine.166 While critics may charge that this leaves judges in an 
“anything goes” world and the law as “nothing more than a reflection 
of judges’ political views,” Strauss counters that judges are 
constrained by their own professional training and their own 
perceptions of their institutional role.167 For Strauss, judges draw on 
traditional legal tools to make decisions in constitutional cases—tools 
like judicial precedent, legal craft, and sound judgment.168 And while 
judges cannot help but be shaped by their society’s evolving values, 
judges need not simply yield to public opinion—especially when 
threats of majoritarian tyranny loom.169 
Over time, judges must simply read cases, employ analogical 
reasoning, and develop constitutional doctrine in a case-by-case, 
common-law manner. At the same time, Strauss is candid that when 
traditional legal resources run out—or when a result is sufficiently out 
of step with one’s normative commitments—the judge will “often” base 
her ruling on “her views about which decision will be more fair or is 
more in keeping with good social policy.”170 This approach is consistent 
with the common-law tradition, but inconsistent with popular 
constitutional argument.171 
Even with Strauss’s nuanced account of living 
constitutionalism, familiar dangers remain. Strauss offers little 
concrete guidance to the judge in the individual case—other than an 
appeal to her own professional training, independent judgment, and 
sense of judicial humility. His theory is one of sensibility, not 
methodology. He also provides little specific guidance for when a judge 
may overturn precedent. Instead, those questions turn on some 
combination of judicial caution, professional norms, and moral 
judgments. Strauss’s defense may accurately describe constitutional 
practice, but popular constitutionalists may want additional guidance 
for judges.  
In the end, popular constitutional argument offers the 
possibility of a principled, constrained form of living 
constitutionalism—one that limits judicial discretion by forcing judges 
to analyze concrete indicators of public opinion.172 For the popular 
constitutional judge, it simply will not do to rely on generic appeals to 
 
 166. Strauss, supra note 78, at 891. 
 167. See id. at 879, 927–28, 931–32. 
 168. Id. at 931. 
 169. See id. at 930–31. 
 170. STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 165, at 38. 
 171. See Strauss, supra note 78, at 900. 
 172. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 696–97. 
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the “evolving” constitutional views of the American people or on one’s 
own conclusions about sound policy or political morality.  
When the American people have spoken, the popular 
constitutional judge must listen. Sometimes she might discover a 
popular constitutional consensus that reinforces her own 
conclusions—with popular constitutional argument countering 
charges of judicial adventurism and strengthening the judge’s claim to 
speak for the community. However, other times she might be 
compelled to follow the American people’s constitutional voice—even if 
she does not like what she hears. Either way, popular constitutional 
argument does not rely on a judge’s own independent judgment about 
policy or morality. However, it is up to popular constitutional theory to 
identify the methodological tools required to make popular 
constitutional argument work. 
3. The Ackermanian Challenge: Taking Popular Sovereignty 
Originalism Seriously 
Like the popular constitutionalist, Bruce Ackerman argues 
that the American people must play a key role in constitutional 
change. As a leading theorist of popular sovereignty, Ackerman 
provides extensive theoretical guidance to the popular 
constitutionalist seeking to identify when the American people have 
spoken on key constitutional issues. However, Ackerman’s approach is 
distinct in many ways. Most importantly, it limits popular sovereignty 
to certain important periods of higher lawmaking—leaving judges and 
lawyers to protect each revolutionary generation’s achievements and 
work out their meaning over time. The popular constitutionalist seeks 
to offer a more flexible approach—one that shares Ackerman’s central 
goal and borrows from many of his core insights but also allows 
interpreters to identify popular constitutional consensus outside of 
what Ackerman has famously labeled “constitutional moments.” 
Ackerman’s theory offers a unique mix of constitutional 
dynamism and legal formalism.173 Through a “reflective study of the 
past,” Ackerman looks to American constitutional history to identify 
patterns of legitimate constitutional lawmaking.174 His goal is to build 
an account of how the Constitution changes outside of the context of 
Article V. Through this study of history, Ackerman seeks a formal rule 
 
 173. See Ackerman, supra note 155, at 1754. 
 174. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 17. 
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of recognition—one that allows him to distinguish between genuine 
acts of popular sovereignty and the mere acts of ordinary politics.175 
As Ackerman teaches, the pathways of constitutional change 
are not identical. Different historical “cases”—e.g., the Founding, 
Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights Revolution—
privilege different institutional arrangements, different agents of 
change, and different legal materials.176 However, within these 
variations, Ackerman identifies certain key similarities—the key 
components of his “constitutional moments.”177   
In each case, a new constitutional proposal must run a 
multiyear institutional gauntlet, characterized by national debates, 
high-profile political battles, important elections, and contentious 
Supreme Court fights.178 Constitutional reformers must persuade an 
engaged public, win a series of institutional battles, attract support (or 
force acquiescence) from their political opponents, and convince the 
Supreme Court to translate their constitutional victories into durable 
constitutional doctrine.179 This is how Ackerman identifies when the 
American people have spoken.180 It is a powerful account, albeit one 
that has been attacked on multiple fronts.181 Regardless, it remains a 
helpful model for popular constitutional argument: part guidebook, 
part cautionary tale.  
While Ackerman has never provided a full account of how a 
committed Ackermanian might interpret the Constitution, he has 
provided glimpses in various works. In the remainder of this Section, I 
attempt to construct an approach to Ackermanian interpretation and 
then set it in dialogue with popular constitutional argument. 
For Ackerman, the American people are the key agents of 
constitutional change, and judges are bound by the American people’s 
 
 175. Id. at 59. 
 176. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 542 (2014); 1 
ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 58–80. 
 177. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 58–80. 
 178. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 43–47; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 3–31; 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 266–94 (1997). 
 179. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 42. 
 180. Id. at 51. 
 181. See, e.g., Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 697–98 (complaining that Ackerman’s 
theory is too difficult to apply); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 
CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994) (arguing that Reconstruction’s collapse must be read as a 
“constitutional moment”); David A. Strauss, The Neo-Hamiltonian Temptation, 123 YALE L.J. 
2676 (2014) (arguing that Ackerman’s account doesn’t match what the constitutional reformers 
thought they were doing at the time); cf. GERARD MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007) (exploring the 
constitutional importance of the Jacksonian Age). 
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considered judgments during periods of higher lawmaking.182 To 
decide a constitutional issue, the Ackermanian interpreter must draw 
on past patterns of higher lawmaking to identify when the American 
people have spoken.183 This is the most fully developed part of 
Ackerman’s theory. Interpreters must engage in the delicate task of 
distinguishing between acts of ordinary politics and acts of higher 
lawmaking—in other words, genuine acts of popular sovereignty.184 In 
the former, elected officials are permitted to act within the boundaries 
set by the written Constitution and by the principles laid down during 
those rare moments when “We the People” have spoken.185 In the 
latter, the American people can rewrite the constitutional rules—but 
only if constitutional reformers gain the “broad” and “sustained” 
support of the American people and traverse Ackerman’s pathway of 
constitutional change.186 In other words, the reform proposal must 
qualify as a bona fide “constitutional moment.” Importantly, for the 
interpreter, any principles endorsed during these constitutional 
moments have just as much legal force as an Article V amendment, 
shaping the outcome of new constitutional cases and entrenching 
these new principles against political reversals (absent another act of 
popular sovereignty that meets Ackerman’s test).187 
From there, the Ackermanian interpreter must look to 
synthesize the constitutional principles endorsed by the American 
people over time—incorporating new principles and refining (or, in 
some cases, discarding) old ones.188 Ackerman offers few details about 
how this process of “intergenerational synthesis” might work,189 but 
his account does capture a core aspect of American constitutional 
practice: the tendency to read new constitutional revolutions against 
the enduring commitments of our past and to try to “fit” any new 
principles into a “larger pattern of constitutional development.”190  
As part of this process, judges both preserve and synthesize. 
They guard old principles from reversal by ordinary politicians and 
 
 182. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 139. 
 183. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 337; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 58–80, 266–94; 2 
ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 3–31. 
 184. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 230–94. 
 185. Id. at 230–65. 
 186. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 224; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 266–94; 2 
ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 3–31. 
 187. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 33, 225, 317. 
 188. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 336; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 207–54 
(analyzing the Reconstruction regime’s principles against those established by the Founding 
generation). 
 189. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 144. 
 190. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 1, 336. 
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give new principles concrete legal content through the creation of 
durable constitutional doctrine.191 This happens through a common 
law process, with judges facing “concrete cases” that force them “to 
confront and reconcile . . . the disparate historical achievements of the 
American people.”192 Of course, there is no mechanical way to carry 
out this process. Instead, Ackerman leaves it to judges and lawyers—
whether through professional legal judgment, statesmanship, or some 
combination thereof—to synthesize these principles one case at a time, 
applying the constitutional principles of the past to today’s 
constitutional controversies.  
Unlike the popular constitutional interpreter, the Ackermanian 
judge is not tasked with seeking out contemporary public opinion for 
guidance. Current opinion is the product of normal politics, and the 
Ackermanian has no guarantee that it reflects the considered 
judgment of the American people—a judgment shaped by heightened 
engagement, broad debate, political contestation, and extended 
deliberation. Better to ignore contemporary public opinion and await 
the next constitutional moment (or lead it). Popular constitutional 
interpreters are more open to identifying popular consensus outside of 
Ackerman’s constitutional moments, recognizing the call of the 
American people on an ongoing basis.193 This approach allows the 
popular constitutional interpreter to respond to one of the strongest 
objections to Ackerman’s theory—that it fails to offer a satisfying 
account of many key constitutional transformations that occur in 
between Ackerman’s constitutional moments.  
Of course, popular constitutional argument is not without risk. 
Like Ackerman, popular constitutional theorists must design their 
own safeguards against constitutional false positives—instances when 
public opinion may reflect the half-baked views of an inattentive 
public or when elected officials may claim a false mandate for 
constitutional reform. In short, the popular constitutional interpreter 
increases the difficulty of identifying when the American people have 
spoken—a challenge that Ackerman addresses through his demanding 
rule of recognition.194  
In the end, Ackerman already provides the interpreter with 
some theoretical guidance. So far, popular constitutionalists have 
failed to offer the same. In this Article, my goal is to fill this gap—both 
addressing Ackerman’s legitimate concerns about the dangers of false 
 
 191. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 139.  
 192. Id. at 160. 
 193. Strauss, supra note 78, at 905. 
 194. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 278–80; Grewal & Purdy, supra note 51, at 697–98. 
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positives and providing the interpreter with more flexible interpretive 
tools than Ackerman’s multistage process—tools that allow the 
interpreter to identify periods of constitutional change outside of 
Ackerman’s constitutional moments. 
4. Originalism: Is Popular Constitutional Argument a Rule of 
Constitutional Construction? 
Originalists take a range of interpretive approaches, and many 
(if not most) originalists would reject popular constitutional argument 
outright.195 However, one of originalism’s key insights may help 
situate popular constitutional argument within the wider universe of 
constitutional theory. 
Originalists are bound by the Constitution’s original 
meaning.196 As Keith Whittington explains, “At its most basic, 
originalism argues that the discoverable . . . meaning of the 
Constitution at the time of its . . . adoption should be regarded as 
authoritative for purposes of later constitutional interpretation.”197 To 
understand the interpreter’s task, many originalists divide 
constitutional analysis into two separate phases: interpretation and 
construction.198  
Interpretation uses traditional legal materials to determine the 
original meaning of the Constitution’s text.199 However, there are 
limits to what the interpreter can determine through “relatively 
technical and traditional instruments, such as text and structure, 
framers’ intent, and precedent.”200 Once the interpreter reaches these 
limits, the task of construction remains. Construction “fills the 
inevitable gaps created by the vagueness” of the Constitution’s text 
“when applied to particular circumstances.”201 As Whittington 
explains, “[A]dditional meaning . . . must be constructed from the 
political melding of the document with external interests and 
 
 195. For an overview of the originalism literature, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism 
Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); and Keith E. Whittington, 
Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013).  
 196. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 144 (1990); Whittington, supra note 195, at 379. 
 197. Whittington, supra note 195, at 377. 
 198. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 153; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). Originalists also 
distinguish between “vagueness” and “ambiguity.” Solum, supra, at 97–98. 
 199. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 100–01 (2004). 
 200. WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 1. 
 201. BARNETT, supra note 199, at 102. 
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principles,”202 with “[c]onstructions perform[ing] important work by 
filling in gaps of constitutional meaning.”203 
The Constitution’s text speaks clearly in some places—often 
with narrow, easy-to-apply rules.204 For instance, a twenty-five-year-
old cannot be president. However, the Constitution also includes broad 
language—principles like “equal protection,” “due process of law,” 
“privileges or immunities,” and “freedom of speech.”205 Of course, these 
“abstract, general, and vague” pieces of constitutional text are 
precisely the provisions on which most of the Supreme Court’s high-
profile cases turn.206 When a term is irreducibly vague or ambiguous—
in other words, when traditional legal materials fail to resolve a 
particular constitutional issue—interpretation ends and construction 
begins. The question remains: Which institution should we entrust 
with this task? 
Some originalists argue that when interpretation ends, so too 
should the judicial task itself.207 In short, judges should simply defer 
to the elected branches and allow them to engage in constitutional 
construction.208 This is a reasonable conclusion—and one that is 
consistent with an account of judicial decisionmaking closely linked to 
a judge’s legal expertise. When traditional legal materials run out, 
there is simply nothing more for the judge to do. Construction becomes 
a political task for the elected branches. However, some originalists 
disagree, reserving an important role for judges in the task of 
constitutional construction.209  
For these scholars, within the “construction zone,” judges 
might choose to apply a rule of constitutional construction that is 
guided by a particular normative principle—whether tied to the 
American constitutional tradition, a freestanding theory, or some 
combination of the two.210 For instance, Randy Barnett argues that 
 
 202. WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 1. 
 203. Whittington, supra note 195, at 403. 
 204. See BALKIN, supra note 153, at 6. 
 205. See id. (‘The text of our Constitution contains different kinds of language. It contains 
determinate rules . . . . It contains standards . . . . And it contains principles.”).  
 206. See Solum, supra note 198, at 108. 
 207. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 157. 
 208. Whittington, supra note 195, at 404; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 158. 
 209. Whittington, supra note 195, at 401. Of course, originalists also disagree about how 
many issues interpretation resolves—and, conversely, about the size of the construction zone. Id. 
at 404. This question is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I focus on what the popular 
constitutional interpreter should do inside the construction zone—no matter its size. Even so, 
debates over the construction zone’s size remain important to popular constitutional theory. If 
the construction zone is large, popular constitutional argument may touch a great number of 
issues. If it is small, then it will not. 
 210. See Solum, supra note 198, at 108. 
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when interpretation runs out, judges should apply a “presumption of 
liberty.”211 Following Barnett, popular constitutional argument might 
be understood as a rule of constitutional construction, applied by 
judges when the Constitution’s original meaning runs out.212  
Like many originalists, popular constitutionalists fear judicial 
adventurism, seeking to root judges’ interpretations in concrete 
indicators—not personal normative preferences.213 There is no reason 
why a popular constitutional interpreter could not combine a version 
of originalism with popular constitutional argument. For instance, 
when the Constitution’s original meaning is clear, the popular 
constitutional interpreter might apply it in much the same way as an 
originalist. However, when the traditional legal materials run out—
when the Constitution’s text is vague or irreducibly ambiguous and 
the American people have reached a considered judgment on the 
issue—the popular constitutionalist might apply popular consensus as 
a default rule.214 
But how might the interpreter actually go about that task? In 
other words, how might she identify when the American people have 
spoken? We turn to that important question in Part III. 
III. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE: THE FORMS OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
To make popular constitutional argument work, scholars must 
provide interpreters with the methodological tools necessary to 
identify when the American people have reached a considered 
judgment about the Constitution’s meaning.  
In this Part, I take up that task, exploring a variety of public 
opinion indicators available to interpreters. These indicators are the 
component pieces of popular constitutional argument. Sometimes one 
of these indicators will stand alone. More often, they will work 
together, allowing the interpreter to explore whether the American 
people have reached a popular consensus about a given constitutional 
issue. As with any other form of constitutional argument, popular 
constitutional argument is unlikely to settle our most vexing 
constitutional issues. However, it may be a useful tool to help us reach 
a satisfying conclusion in a given case. 
 
 211. BARNETT, supra note 199, at 253–73. 
 212. Popular constitutional argument only conflicts directly with originalism if an 
interpreter argues that contemporary values should supersede the Constitution’s original 
meaning. But this result need not follow from popular constitutionalism’s core. 
 213. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 140. 
 214. See Solum, supra note 198, at 104–05; Whittington, supra note 195, at 404. 
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This catalogue is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead, I build 
on previous scholarship to create a typology of public opinion 
indicators—a typology that can be refined and supplemented in future 
work. My goal is to draw on constitutional practice and previous 
scholarship to bring coherence to popular constitutional analysis. Only 
then will we be in a better position to determine whether popular 
constitutional argument is a viable and attractive approach to 
constitutional interpretation. Admittedly, some modes of analysis are 
more common than others. However, interpreters can use all of these 
indicators to form powerful constitutional arguments rooted in 
popular consensus. 
A. State and Local Laws, Actions, and Activities 
The most familiar form of popular constitutional argument 
draws on state and local laws, actions, and activities.215 This form of 
argument is already well established as a matter of constitutional 
practice, and scholars have already explored certain features of it in 
detail. Nevertheless, it is worth disaggregating its component parts to 
better understand its various forms. While many scholars have 
focused on state legislation counting as one source of popular 
constitutional authority, the interpreter might look to a variety of 
other indicators tied to states and localities, including state 
constitutions, state and local government amicus participation, 
patterns of law enforcement, ballot measures, and the everyday 
practices of the American people and their governments. I consider 
each of these indicators in turn. 
 
State Legislation. The most familiar form of state and local 
constitutional argument is state legislation counting. In her 
pioneering scholarship, Corinna Barrett Lain has already shown the 
pervasiveness of this practice.216 Her scholarship highlights that 
judges look to the state laws on the books to address not just familiar 
areas like the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process, but 
also a range of others, including procedural due process, equal 
protection, religious liberty, free speech, searches and seizures, and 
takings.217  
State legislation counting touches on many of the interpretive 
areas in which popular constitutional argument is most useful. For 
 
 215. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 97 (2012). 
 216. Lain, supra note 18. 
 217. Id. at 367–68, 371–405. 
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instance, Justices often use state legislation counts to strike down 
outdated laws or governmental practices. This is a familiar move, so a 
brief example should suffice. Consider the Court’s long-standing 
approach to the Eighth Amendment. In this context, the Court looks to 
state legislation to help apply the Constitution’s ban on “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”218 To that end, the Court often considers both 
the state laws on the books and any trends in legislative activity.219 
Lain’s scholarship shows that the Justices apply similar reasoning in 
other constitutional contexts.220  
At the same time, the Justices often use state legislation counts 
to defend the constitutionality of such laws and practices—drawing on 
the popular constitutional authority of state legislation to argue that a 
particular law or practice is consistent with a national consensus. On 
the Roberts Court, Justices from across the ideological spectrum have 
relied on this form of popular constitutional argument.  
Consider Chief Justice Roberts and the campaign-finance 
context. Chief Justice Roberts turned to state legislation counting in 
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar when applying strict scrutiny to a 
Florida regulation preventing judicial candidates from personally 
soliciting campaign funds.221 The Chief Justice looked to the rules in 
other states and concluded that “[l]ike Florida, most other States 
prohibit judicial candidates from soliciting campaign funds 
personally . . . [with] 30 of the 39 States that elect trial or appellate 
judges . . . adopt[ing] [similar] restrictions.”222 Chief Justice Roberts 
used these state judgments to reach an important conclusion about 
the relationship between direct judicial fundraising and perceptions of 
corruption: “Simply put, Florida and most other States have concluded 
that the public may lack confidence in a judge’s ability to administer 
justice without fear or favor if he comes to office by asking for 
favors.”223 As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the Florida 
regulation survived strict scrutiny—with the Florida rule “advanc[ing] 
 
 218. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 714–19 (2014) 
(analyzing how states had adopted IQ cutoffs in death penalty cases when determining if 
Florida’s strict cutoff was unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307, 312–17 (2002) 
(determining if imposing the death penalty on a person with a severe mental disability was 
unconstitutional and considering state legislation). 
 219. Lain, supra note 18, at 373; see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (using a state legislation 
count as part of a constitutional ruling striking down state laws imposing the death penalty on 
those with severe mental disabilities); id. at 322–24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (expressing 
support for state legislation counting). 
 220. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 18, at 367–68, 371–405. 
 221. 575 U.S. 433, 437–41, 445, 454 (2015).  
 222. Id. at 440. 
 223. Id. at 445. 
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the State’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the 
integrity of the judiciary.”224 
Similar examples in the campaign-finance context abound—
often in dissent. For instance, both conservative and progressive 
Justices have used similar arguments in the context of corporate 
campaign expenditures.225 In Citizens United v. FEC, Justice Stevens 
drew on state legislation counts in his dissent, observing that “half the 
state legislatures . . . over many decades” have concluded that “their 
core functions of administering elections and passing legislation 
cannot operate effectively without some narrow restrictions on 
corporate electioneering paid for by general treasury funds.”226  
Similarly, nearly four decades earlier (and also in dissent), 
then-Justice Rehnquist turned to state legislation counts in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. In Bellotti, Rehnquist drew, in 
part, on state legislative judgments about both the value and the 
constitutionality of restrictions on corporate campaign spending to 
support the constitutionality of a Massachusetts law regulating 
corporate political activity, observing that the “legislatures of 30 other 
States . . . have considered [this] matter, and have concluded that 
[such] restrictions . . . are both politically desirable and 
constitutionally permissible. The judgment of such a broad consensus 
of governmental bodies expressed over a period of many decades is 
entitled to considerable deference.”227 
Returning to the Roberts Court and moving beyond campaign 
finance, Justice Alito has looked to state legislation in a variety of 
contexts. Consider his concurrence in Riley v. California.228 There, the 
Court held that police officers must generally secure a warrant before 
searching digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual 
who has been arrested.229 Justice Alito agreed with the Court’s 
judgment, but he wrote separately to address a few points, one of 
which drew a connection between state legislation and how best to 
apply the Fourth Amendment in the digital age.230  
 
 224. Id. at 444. 
 225. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 284 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (evaluating 
Vermont contribution limits, comparing those limits to those passed by other states, and arguing 
that Vermont’s limits should be upheld because they were “not remarkable departures” from 
those of other states). 
 226. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 421 n.46 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 227. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 228. 573 U.S. 373, 404–08 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 229. Id. at 403 (majority opinion). 
 230. Id. at 404–08 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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While Justice Alito saw no alternative to the majority’s 
approach in Riley, he urged the Court to continue to look to the states 
for alternative rules. For Justice Alito, state legislation might serve as 
a useful source of information for judges—one rooted in the 
legislature’s substantive expertise and its ties to the public’s views. As 
he explained, “I would reconsider the question presented here 
if . . . state legislatures, after assessing the legitimate needs of law 
enforcement and the privacy interests of cell phone owners, enact 
legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based on categories of 
information or perhaps other variables.”231 On this view, state 
legislation may help the Justices determine what sort of police 
behavior is “reasonable” in the context of the Fourth Amendment and 
how to strike the right balance between security and digital privacy.232 
Justice Alito has applied similar reasoning elsewhere, particularly in 
the First Amendment context (and often in dissent).233  
The Justices also use state legislation to both identify 
unenumerated rights worthy of constitutional protection and 
incorporate Bill of Rights provisions against the states. Some scholars 
argue that the use of popular constitutional arguments in this context 
is consistent with the Constitution’s text and history—most notably, 
under the Ninth Amendment (for unenumerated rights) and the 
Fourteenth Amendment (for unenumerated rights and 
incorporation).234 The Supreme Court has followed suit.235 
 
 231. Id. at 407–08. 
 232. Interestingly, Alito made a similar argument in United States v. Jones—another Fourth 
Amendment and technology case. See 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw 
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”). 
 233. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 806 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (warning the Court not to “hastily dismiss the judgment of legislators, who may 
be in a better position . . . to assess the implications of new technology”); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 
U.S. 443, 463–75 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (looking at the state tort law landscape and 
attacking the Court for rejecting a plaintiff’s tort claim for emotional harms associated with an 
offensive protest at a military funeral); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 496 & n.6 (2010) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that state legislation against animal cruelty reflected a “national 
consensus” and, in turn, this consensus provides “proof” that the “government interest” in 
regulating animal cruelty videos was “compelling”). 
 These Alito opinions call to mind Chief Justice Rehnquist’s use of state legislation counting 
to frame flag-burning as low value speech for purposes of First Amendment doctrine. See Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 435 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Surely one of the high 
purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against conduct that is regarded as evil and 
profoundly offensive to the majority of people—whether it be murder, embezzlement, pollution, 
or flag burning.”). 
 234. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 52, at 1781–82 (“[I]n recognizing new rights, judges are not 
amending the [Constitution]. Rather, they are applying it, construing directives in the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments that call for protection of fundamental but nonspecified rights.”). 
 235. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 777 (2010) (using a state legislation 
count to support the move to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states); Lawrence 
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In the end, state legislation remains a well established and 
powerful source for the popular constitutional interpreter. However, 
the Supreme Court looks to more than state legislation in this context. 
 
State Constitutions. The popular constitutional interpreter may 
study the rights enshrined in state constitutions. Because these 
constitutions are easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution, they are 
often a better proxy for contemporary public opinion than their federal 
counterpart. Furthermore, many scholars have turned to the study of 
state constitutions in recent years.236 The Supreme Court has 
similarly heeded this call.237 
For instance, in her dissent in Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia v. Comer, Justice Sotomayor argued that state funding for 
religious institutions was unconstitutional.238 As part of her analysis, 
she turned to state constitutional provisions covering this issue. After 
explaining the long tradition of restricting funding for these 
institutions, Justice Sotomayor observed that thirty-nine states 
enshrined this tradition in their constitutions through provisions that, 
“as a general matter, date back to or before these States’ original 
Constitutions.”239 For Justice Sotomayor, these provisions reflected 
“this Nation’s understanding of how best to foster religious liberty.”240 
 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (looking to patterns in state legislation to show “an emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct 
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 
723 (1997) (observing that “almost every State” makes it “a crime to assist a suicide” and 
warning that recognizing a constitutional right to die would “strike down the considered policy 
choice of almost every State”). 
 236. See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006) 
(analyzing state convention debates as a means of revising and rejecting governing principles as 
adopted in the federal convention of 1787); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012) (examining the structures of the U.S. 
Constitution and the constitutions of the states and studying the connection between these 
documents and the growing political dissent in the country); EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS 
IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 
(Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 2013) (arguing that state constitutions contain positive rights that are 
ignored by federal constitutional politics); Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual 
Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What 
Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008) 
(providing an analysis of individual rights in state constitutions); Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. 
Agudo & Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are 
Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2012) 
(continuing the analysis of individual rights in state constitutions). 
 237. For instance, the Supreme Court looked to the gun rights enshrined in state 
constitutions when determining whether to incorporate the Second Amendment against the 
states. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769. 
 238. 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2027–41 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 239. Id. at 2037. 
 240. Id. 
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State and Local Governments Inside the Courts. The popular 
constitutional interpreter might also follow the Supreme Court in 
looking to state and local governmental participation in constitutional 
litigation.241 For instance, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the 
Supreme Court noted an amicus brief “submitted by 38 states” as part 
of its analysis of whether to incorporate the Second Amendment 
against the states.242 Similarly, in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme 
Court highlighted that “Florida and 12 other States” brought that 
constitutional challenge against the Affordable Care Act and “were 
subsequently joined by 13 [additional] States.”243 
 
Patterns of State and Local Law Enforcement. The popular 
constitutional interpreter might look to patterns of state and local law 
enforcement. This form of analysis played a key role in the Supreme 
Court’s decision striking down Texas’s antisodomy law in Lawrence v. 
Texas.244  
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy not only surveyed the 
state laws on the books, but he also looked to state and local 
enforcement of existing antisodomy laws. Justice Kennedy observed 
that these laws were rarely enforced by state and local law 
enforcement officials.245 He explained, “Laws prohibiting sodomy do 
not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in 
private,” making it “difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous 
and systematic punishment of the consensual acts committed in 
private and by adults.”246 In other words, Justice Kennedy enforced a 
form of constitutional desuetude.247 
 
State Ballot Measures. Each of the indicators above draws on 
official government action—an indirect means of assessing popular 
constitutional views. State and local ballot measures offer a more 
direct means of assessing public opinion.  
 
 241. See Blocher, supra note 30, at 111–14 (discussing the important but often overlooked 
role of state attorneys general in popular constitutionalism). 
 242. 561 U.S. at 789. 
 243. 567 U.S. 519, 540 (2012). 
 244. 539 U.S. 558, 569–70, 573 (2003). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 569–70. 
 247. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (noting that “even among those States 
that regularly execute offenders . . . only five have executed offenders possessing a known IQ less 
than 70” in recent years and concluding that, given these enforcement patterns, the practice had 
“become truly unusual”). 
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While most ballot measures address specific questions of public 
policy, some states and localities have used advisory ballot measures 
to assess the public’s views on constitutional issues—for instance, the 
constitutionality of corporate campaign spending after Citizens 
United.248 However, even policy-focused ballot measures may prove 
useful in building popular constitutional arguments. And although not 
a prevalent source at the Supreme Court, some Justices have relied on 
state ballot measures as a gloss on whether a state law served a 
compelling enough interest to survive constitutional review.249 
 
The Everyday Practices of the American People and Their 
Governments. Finally, the popular constitutional interpreter may look 
to the everyday practices of the American people and their state and 
local governments. This approach is consistent with Supreme Court 
practice. When analyzing a constitutional issue, the Justices 
sometimes look to how state and local governments operate, how the 
American people live their lives, or some combination of governmental 
and community practices. 
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court looked to 
the pervasiveness of state legislative prayer when determining the 
constitutionality of prayer at a town council meeting.250 The Supreme 
Court upheld the practice, and, in his majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy drew on state and local governmental practice to support his 
conclusion.251  
As Justice Kennedy explained, the Establishment Clause 
“must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and 
understandings.’ ”252 The Court had already upheld state legislative 
prayer decades earlier in the context of state legislatures, relying, in 
part, on the fact that “the majority of the other States also had the 
 
 248. Vikram David Amar, Are “Advisory” Measures (Like Proposition 49) Permitted on the 
California Ballot?, VERDICT (Aug. 29, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/08/29/advisory-
measures-like-proposition-49-permitted-california-ballot [https://perma.cc/T5KT-R2XE] 
(describing advisory ballot measures assessing constitutional support for Citizens United).   
 249. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 761–72 
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (drawing conclusions about the public’s views about money in 
politics and corruption from a state ballot measure); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S 
377, 394 (2000) (“[A]lthough majority votes do not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections, 
the statewide vote on Proposition A [a campaign-finance measure] certainly attested to the 
perception relied upon here: ‘An overwhelming 74 percent of voters of Missouri determined that 
contribution limits are necessary to combat corruption and the perception thereof.’ ” (quoting 
Carver v. Nixon, 882 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D. Mo. 1995), rev’d, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 
528 U.S. 377 (2000))). 
 250. 572 U.S. 565, 574–81 (2014). 
 251. See id.  
 252. Id. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989)). 
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same, consistent practice” for “more than a century.”253 After turning 
to modern practice, Justice Kennedy observed that “dozens of state 
legislatures” continued to use legislative prayer and local governments 
often opened meetings with a prayer as well.254 As a result, Justice 
Kennedy concluded, “[T]here can be no doubt that the practice . . . has 
become part of the fabric of our society.”255  
The Justices have also sought to incorporate the American 
people’s everyday practices into constitutional doctrine.256 For 
instance, the Supreme Court adapted First Amendment doctrine to 
the evolving role that film played in the lives of the American people.  
In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Supreme Court 
addressed the constitutionality of a New York law permitting the 
restriction of films on the grounds that they were “sacrilegious.”257 The 
Court had previously upheld legislation creating an Ohio board of 
censors that screened films before they were shown in public.258 In 
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, the Court relied, in part, 
on the role of film in early twentieth-century American society to 
uphold the Ohio board, explaining that “the exhibition of moving 
pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for 
profit, like other spectacles.”259 As a result, the Supreme Court 
concluded that films were “not to be regarded . . . as part of the press 
of the country, or as organs of public opinion”—that is, media 
protected by enduring free speech values.260 
The Supreme Court decided Mutual Film before it incorporated 
the First Amendment against the states. In Burstyn, the Supreme 
Court addressed “whether motion pictures are within the ambit of 
protection which the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, 
secures to any form of ‘speech’ or ‘the press.’ ”261 To answer that 
question, the Court relied, in part, on film’s role within American 
culture—a role that had shifted considerably since Mutual Film was 
decided in 1915: 
 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 570. 
 255. Id. at 576. 
 256. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 438 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (reviewing 
the American flag’s role as “an important national asset” in everyday life). 
 257. 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952); see also Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53 (1995) (describing the relationship between film’s role in 
American culture and its treatment in First Amendment doctrine). 
 258. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 244–45 (1915) overruled in part by 
Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495. 
 259. Id. at 244. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501. 
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It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the 
communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of 
ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political [and] social doctrine to the subtle 
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion 
pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed 
to entertain as well as to inform.262  
Given film’s important role in American society, the Court 
concluded “that expression by means of motion pictures is included 
within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”263 
Finally, the Supreme Court combined governmental and public 
practices to form a powerful popular constitutional argument in 
Dickerson v. United States.264 There, the Court was asked to 
reconsider Miranda based on a law enacted by Congress two years 
after that landmark decision, which was designed to restore the pre-
Miranda legal framework.265 The majority opinion was authored by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was a longtime critic of Miranda. In a 
powerful passage, he explored the relationship between precedent, 
governmental practice, and popular culture:  
Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the 
warnings have become part of our national culture. While we have overruled our 
precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, we 
do not believe that this has happened to the Miranda decision. If anything, our 
subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law 
enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that unwarned statements may 
not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.266 
Rehnquist’s reasoning in Dickerson remains one of the most powerful 
statements of popular constitutional argument in the U.S. Reports. 
 
Conclusion. Of course, as sources for popular constitutional 
arguments, indicators covering state and local laws, actions, and 
activities have their limits. For instance, take the most prominent 
popular constitutional source in Supreme Court practice: state 
legislation. This indicator only imperfectly reflects popular 
constitutional views.267 The same may be said of others connected with 
states and localities. Even so, state and local constitutional 
arguments—state legislation counts, state constitutions, state and 
local participation in litigation, law enforcement practices, ballot 
 
 262. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 263. Id. at 502. 
 264. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. at 443–44 (citations omitted). 
 267. For a review of some of these representative deficiencies, see supra Section II.B.1.  
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measures, and the practices of the American people and their 
governments—may serve as key components of a broader popular 
constitutional argument. 
B. The President 
The president has a powerful claim to constitutional 
authority.268 Upon taking office, he must take an oath to “preserve, 
protect and defend” the U.S. Constitution, and he remains the one 
public official who is elected to represent the entire country.269 It is 
little wonder that presidents play a key role in Larry Kramer’s 
pioneering popular constitutional narrative.270 
To build a popular constitutional argument, the interpreter 
may draw on the president’s actions and activities.271 To begin, she 
may analyze the president’s attempts to advance a constitutional 
vision through rhetoric on the campaign trail and while in office. For 
instance, she may look to previous presidential elections, studying the 
arguments made during the campaign and evaluating a president’s 
claim to a popular mandate for a specific constitutional vision 
following an election.272 She may also look to presidential speeches 
once the president takes office, including key moments like inaugural 
addresses and State of the Union speeches.273 While these types of 
arguments are not evident in Supreme Court practice, they remain 
available to the popular constitutional interpreter in future cases. 
More concretely, the interpreter may examine the president’s 
official actions and those taken by executive agencies and officials. 
 
 268. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 82 (2007) 
(explaining that, historically, presidents have “claimed the authority to set the nation on a new 
constitutional path, and in the process . . . rejected key aspects of the preexistent constitutional 
tradition”).  
 269. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 270. Kramer, supra note 35, at 697–98. 
 271. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 69 (explaining that the public conversation 
between presidential candidates Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater, which largely 
concerned racial issues and the New Deal, suggests a living Constitution informed by public 
mandates); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16 (2010) (“In America’s republic of statutes, republican deliberation 
over fundamental national commitment has migrated, relatively speaking, away from 
Constitutionalism and toward legislative and administrative constitutionalism.”); Purdy, supra 
note 30, at 1837–41 (arguing that, while other presidential actions inform some constitutional 
theories, presidential statements and general speech largely impacts American 
constitutionalism). 
 272. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 224 (“While the Court had been in the lead during 
the first decade after Brown, it [became] the president and Congress who were claiming a 
mandate from the people for a new commitment to the pursuit of racial justice.”). 
 273. See 3 id. at 7.  
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These are the ways in which the president may exercise his power to 
advance his constitutional vision while in office. The president may 
work with Congress to pass landmark legislation that may reshape 
core constitutional commitments, as with the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.274 He may veto legislation (and author veto messages), issue 
signing statements, and use executive orders to advance his vision.275 
And executive officials and administrative agencies may issue 
regulations to promote a president’s constitutional vision.276 
In addition, the president’s lawyers may also make powerful 
constitutional arguments—both inside and outside the courts. For 
instance, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) regularly answers 
constitutional questions for the president, executive officials, and 
government agencies.277 Although these OLC opinions vary in quality 
and persuasiveness, they are often as detailed and rigorous as judicial 
opinions, and the OLC’s lawyers are often drawn from the nation’s 
best law firms and law schools.278  
More importantly, the Solicitor General advances the 
president’s constitutional vision inside the courts.279 The Solicitor 
General’s office is highly respected within the judiciary and at the 
Supreme Court.280 As a result, it often plays a key role in shaping the 
Court’s docket at the certiorari stage by helping the Court identify 
meritorious petitions among the thousands that it receives each 
year.281 And at the merits stage, the Solicitor General offers skilled 
 
 274. See 3 id. at 95–104 (describing the integral role of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s public 
statements and private acts in influencing Congress during deliberation over the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964). 
 275. Lain, supra note 30, at 1633. 
 276. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 171 (describing how the president can often ensure 
that his legislation will create effective change with “the real-world experience generated by the 
administrative process”); ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 271, at 10 (“The biggest change in 
the Constitutional structure has been the creation of the modern administrative state, through 
congressional delegations of lawmaking authority to independent agencies . . . .”). 
 277. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 95–110 
(2010). 
 278. Id. at 98–99. 
 279. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 30, at 1631–33 (explaining that the Supreme Court grants a 
large percentage of certiorari requests and rules in favor of the Solicitor General a majority of 
the time); Snyder, supra note 122, at 383, 416 (describing Justice Frankfurter’s overtures to a 
former law clerk within the Solicitor General’s office and probable deference to the Obama 
administration’s refusal to defend the Defense of Marriage Act). 
 280. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 217 (1991) (“[W]hen the federal government seeks review, the chances of a case 
being taken are quite high.”). 
 281. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1116 (1988) (“Previous research indicates 
that cases are most likely to be selected for plenary review when . . . the solicitor general is the 
petitioner.”).  
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legal arguments that aid the Court in resolving difficult constitutional 
issues.282 The Solicitor General’s office derives its authority from its 
combined role as the voice of the executive branch in the courts and as 
an important repeat player at the Supreme Court. The Department of 
Justice and lawyers for various executive agencies serve a similar—if 
less influential—role for their specific substantive areas in the courts. 
Presidential constitutional arguments are not prevalent in 
Supreme Court opinions. However, a recent Roberts Court decision, 
NLRB v. Noel Canning,283 shows the power of this approach. There, 
Noel Canning—a Pepsi distributor—asked the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit to set aside a National Labor Relations Board 
order, arguing that the Board lacked a quorum because three of the 
five Board members had been appointed in violation of the Recess 
Appointments Clause.284 This was the first time the Supreme Court 
was ever called on to interpret that Clause. 
As part of his majority opinion, Justice Breyer drew heavily on 
historical practice and the executive branch’s conclusions about the 
scope of the Recess Appointments Clause. This included the 
presidents’ consistent practice of issuing recess appointments during 
intrasession recesses and official opinions written by the presidents’ 
legal advisors providing constitutional support for these decisions.285 
In the process, Justice Breyer cited written opinions by the Attorney 
General and the OLC, treating them much as he would Court 
precedent.   
For instance, take Justice Breyer’s analysis of the words 
“vacancies that may happen” in the Recess Appointments Clause. He 
concluded that this phrase encompassed both vacancies that had come 
into being during a congressional recess and those that arose prior to a 
recess.286 To reach this conclusion, he relied on the constitutional 
judgments of presidents from the early republic through today—
including Presidents John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, 
and James Monroe.287 He also drew on the opinions of various 
Attorneys General, including Edmund Randolph (arguing for a narrow 
reading), William Wirt (arguing for a broader reading), and “[n]early 
every subsequent Attorney General to consider the question 
 
 282. See Lain, supra note 30, at 1631–32 (describing the Solicitor General’s opinion as 
particularly influential). 
 283. 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
 284. Id. at 520. 
 285. See id. at 549. 
 286. Id. at 539. 
 287. Id. at 543–49. 
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throughout the Nation’s history” (agreeing with Wirt in calling for a 
broader reading).288  
In the process, Justice Breyer also turned to Opinions of the 
Attorney General and OLC opinions from 1832 through 2012.289 
Finally, he observed that “every President since James Buchanan has 
made recess appointments to pre-existing vacancies.”290 Justice Breyer 
concluded, “Taken together, we think it is a fair inference that a large 
proportion of the recess appointments in the history of the Nation 
have filled pre-existing vacancies.”291 The Supreme Court then 
construed the Clause to match this practice. 
In the end, Canning was an unusual case. The Court was 
called on to interpret the Recess Appointments Clause for the first 
time—two hundred years after the ratification of the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer’s opinion shows the promise and the 
power of taking the president’s practices and constitutional arguments 
seriously. 
Interestingly, the Court also explicitly referenced a shift in the 
President’s constitutional positions and reasoning in United States v. 
Windsor.292 There, the Obama Administration refused to defend the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act. In his majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy explicitly referenced this shift in position and the 
Administration’s constitutional conclusions: 
While [this case] was pending, the Attorney General . . . notified the Speaker of the 
House . . . that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality of 
DOMA’s [section] 3. . . . [T]he Attorney General informed Congress that “the President 
has concluded that given a number of factors, including a documented history of 
discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a 
heightened standard of scrutiny.” . . . This case is unusual . . . because [this] letter was 
not preceded by an adverse judgment. The letter instead reflected the Executive’s own 
conclusion, relying on a definition still being debated and considered in the courts, that 
heightened equal protection scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of 
sexual orientation.”293 
Scholars often highlight the importance of this shift by President 
Obama and his lawyers in the constitutional battle over marriage 
equality.294 
 
 288. Id. at 539–44. 
 289. Id. at 544. 
 290. Id. at 545.  
 291. Id. at 546. 
 292. 570 U.S. 744, 754.  
 293. Id. at 753–54 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 294. See Eyer, supra note 30, at 201 (“[T]here is a strong case to be made that the Obama 
announcement helped to shape the ultimate outcomes (invalidation as unconstitutional) of the 
many DOMA challenges that were decided in its aftermath, both in the lower courts and in 
Windsor itself.”). 
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Of course, presidential constitutional arguments are not 
definitive. The president’s actions and activities often say very little 
about the president’s constitutional—as opposed to political—vision. 
Furthermore, even if the president’s actions do advance a 
constitutional vision, that vision may reflect the views of a single 
political party, not a popular constitutional consensus. And finally, 
key executive branch lawyers may not fully represent the views of the 
president.295 In the end, elected officials—whether the president, 
Congress, or state or local officials—are not the people.296 
These caveats aside, popular constitutional interpreters might 
use presidential constitutional arguments in tandem with other 
indicators of public opinion to build powerful popular constitutional 
arguments.  
C. Congress 
To build a popular constitutional argument, the interpreter 
may draw on Congress’s actions and activities.297 Possible 
congressional indicators include individual pieces of legislation, 
patterns of congressional policymaking, long-standing congressional 
practice, congressional amicus participation, and electoral mandates. I 
consider each, in turn. 
 
Congressional Legislation. Beginning with congressional 
legislation, the popular constitutional interpreter may look to 
 
 295. See Lain, supra note 30, at 1632 (“[T]he Solicitor General’s positions are not a perfect 
proxy for those of the executive branch. In theory, the Solicitor General represents the United 
States, not the President, and in practice the Solicitor General enjoys a substantial amount of 
independence in determining what positions to take.”). 
 296. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 131 (“[T]he government is only imperfectly 
representative of the people . . . .”). 
 297. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 8–9 (“[C]ertain landmark statutes are indeed 
rooted in considered judgments of the people, and . . . it is these statutes, not formal 
amendments, that provided the primary vehicle for the legal expression of popular sovereignty in 
the twentieth century.”); ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 271, at 16 (arguing that because 
Constitutional amendments can prove “costly and hard to revoke . . . a more lengthy and 
polycentric statutory process has essentially superseded it”); Amar, supra note 52, at 1782; Lain, 
supra note 30, at 1634 (“Congress communicates its constitutional views by passing legislation 
that reflects a particular constitutional understanding . . . [C]ongressional legislation of this sort 
serves a legitimating function, validating contested constitutional understandings by 
transmitting them into the formal law.”); Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra 
note 11, at 1985–86 (explaining that congressional action increasing civil rights protections 
“demonstrates the institutionally differentiated ways in which Congress and the Court engage in 
constitutional lawmaking”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the 
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2003) (arguing that 
congressional dialogue with the judiciary and exercise of its Section Five power suggest 
significant impact on constitutional culture). 
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landmark statutes and determine their relationship to the 
Constitution’s text, history, and structure.298 As part of this analysis, 
she may examine the legislative history underlying a specific law—
particularly, speeches by congressional leaders and arguments 
advanced in committee reports.299 She may also seek out larger 
patterns in congressional lawmaking.  
Congressional legislation may take on popular constitutional 
importance in a variety of situations. First, congressional legislation 
may provide a source of popular constitutional authority in the context 
of Congress’s enforcement powers under various amendments—most 
notably, the Reconstruction Amendments. While the Supreme Court 
has asserted its own independent authority to set the boundaries of 
Congress’s power under these provisions,300 the Court has long used 
congressional legislation to shape its own constitutional 
understanding in this context.301 Some scholars offer a powerful 
defense of this relationship between the elected branches and 
constitutional doctrine. 
For instance, Akhil Amar argues that robust congressional 
enforcement powers are consistent with the Reconstruction 
Amendments’ text and history.302 And Robert Post and Reva Siegel 
offer a powerful account of the relationship between Congress and the 
Supreme Court in this context. For instance, they argue that when 
Congress passes legislation under its Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power, Congress exercises its own constitutional 
“judgment[ ] about the [Constitution’s] meaning” and, in the process, it 
“vindicate[s] public understandings about the nation’s needs and 
obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment.”303 For them, this 
 
 298. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 199 (“Constitutional pragmatism was a key 
contribution of the landmark statutes of the Second Reconstruction . . . .”); Post, supra note 41, at 
40–41 (discussing President George W. Bush’s description of the recently passed ADA legislation 
as an articulation of America’s democratic principles and notion of equality); Post & Siegel, supra 
note 297, at 1–2, 14, 30–34 (discussing landmark statutes inspiring, and inspired by, landmark 
cases).  
 299. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 150–51. 
 300. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (explaining that the federal 
statute at issue, by controlling cases and controversies, is “beyond congressional authority” and 
that the “Court’s precedent . . . must control”), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc 
(2012), as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 301. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (“The constitutional 
propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical 
experience which it reflects.”). 
 302. See Amar, supra note 52, at 1752. 
 303. Post & Siegel, supra note 297, at 2, 14. 
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process places Congress on “virtually equal” constitutional “footing 
with the Court.”304 
The Justices sometimes draw on Congress’s interpretive 
authority under its enforcement powers to uphold landmark statutes. 
To justify deference, the Justices often appeal to high levels of 
congressional debate and deliberation, Congress’s constitutional role, 
and its democratic imprimatur. For instance, consider the Supreme 
Court’s approach in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.305 
In Katzenbach, the Supreme Court considered a constitutional 
challenge to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”). In his majority 
opinion upholding the VRA, Chief Justice Warren offered a powerful 
defense of Congress’s constitutional conclusions, drawing on 
Congress’s enforcement power,306 its meticulous study of voter 
discrimination, and its overwhelming (and bipartisan) support for the 
legislation. Chief Justice Warren highlighted the years of voter 
discrimination by the states, the “great care” that Congress used in 
studying the problem (including the extensiveness of the related 
hearings), the “voluminous legislative history,” and the 
“overwhelming” votes in favor of the legislation—a bipartisan coalition 
with the “firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in 
voting.”307  
In the process, Chief Justice Warren discussed the length of 
the hearings in the House and Senate and the extent of debate on the 
floors of each House.308 He cited to the legislative record, including 
House and Senate Committee Reports.309 Tracking Congress’s 
constitutional judgment, the Supreme Court then upheld the VRA.310 
Interestingly, nearly a half-century later, Justice Ginsburg used 
similar arguments to defend the VRA in her Shelby County v. Holder 
dissent—drawing on congressional indicators to lay bare the 
countermajoritarian difficulty and attack the Court for subverting the 
 
 304. Post, supra note 41, at 41. 
 305. 383 U.S. at 308–15 (discussing the extensive legislative history and rationale for the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654–56 (1966) (offering 
another powerful example of the Supreme Court reinforcing a robust congressional enforcement 
power); Post & Siegel, supra note 297, at 34–36 (examining the deference that the Court 
awarded to Congress and its interpretation of the Constitution in Katzenbach v. Morgan). 
 306. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324, 326 (arguing that the Reconstruction Framers made 
Congress “chiefly responsible” for enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 307. Id. at 308–09, 315. 
 308. Id. at 308–09. 
 309. Id. at 309, 315. 
 310. Id. at 337. 
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constitutional views of the American people and their elected 
representatives.311 
Second, the popular constitutional interpreter may look to 
larger patterns in congressional lawmaking to discern newly 
established constitutional principles.312 In these cases, the Court uses 
congressional indicators to justify a new construction of constitutional 
text or a shift in constitutional doctrine. This move does not turn on 
simple deference to congressional legislation, as with Katzenbach and 
Ginsburg’s Shelby County dissent, but instead uses congressional 
legislation to interpret the Constitution anew, whether through 
supporting a specific construction, recognizing a constitutionally 
relevant fact, or shifting constitutional doctrine.313 
A Supreme Court plurality took up this approach in Frontiero 
v. Richardson.314 There, a married female air force officer and her 
husband brought a challenge against the Secretary of Defense.315 
Federal law made it more difficult for female officers to receive 
spousal benefits than their male colleagues.316 The challengers argued 
that the Court should recognize that “classifications based upon sex, 
like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are 
inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to 
close . . . scrutiny.”317 In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan 
agreed—drawing, in part, on congressional legislation to support his 
argument that the Court should apply strict scrutiny to gender-based 
discrimination.318  
By the time Frontiero reached the Court, Congress had already 
banned gender discrimination for nine years.319 As part of his analysis, 
Justice Brennan studied the wave of legislation passed in the 1960s 
and 1970s attacking general discrimination, including the Equal Pay 
 
 311. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 559–564, 593 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(telling a powerful story of sustained, “bipartisan” support for the VRA—relying on the 
“overwhelming support” of Congress, Congress’s “conscientious[ ]” study of the problem, and the 
Act’s reauthorization across various Congresses and Presidents). 
 312. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 150–51 (discussing the turn away from a restrictive 
understanding of congressional constitutional power and toward a more inclusive interpretation, 
including expansion of the equal protection and commerce powers). 
 313. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 11, at 1950–51; Post & 
Siegel, supra note 297, at 32 (“The Court’s jurisprudence of sex discrimination illustrates how 
the Court’s constitutional interpretations can draw strength and legitimacy from a dialogic 
relationship to contemporary political culture.”). 
 314. 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973); see also Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra 
note 11, at 2003–04 (noting the role of congressional constitutionalism in Frontiero). 
 315. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677.  
 316. Id. at 679–80. 
 317. Id. at 682. 
 318. Id. at 688. 
 319. See Post & Siegel, supra note 297, at 32 & n.140. 
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Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal 
Rights Amendment.320 Justice Brennan observed, “[O]ver the past 
decade, Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to 
sex-based classifications.”321 Given this legislation, Brennan reasoned, 
“Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are 
inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of 
Government is not without significance to the question presently 
under consideration.”322 
Third, the popular constitutional interpreter may couple laws 
on the books with Congress’s expertise and constitutional judgments 
to justify judicial restraint in the face of a constitutional challenge.323 
While the Frontiero plurality used congressional indicators to 
heighten constitutional protections and attack a federal law, the Court 
might also draw on congressional indicators to defend a law.324 At the 
Supreme Court, this is a popular move in the campaign-finance 
context.325 And many of these types of congressional constitutional 
arguments parallel those that we witnessed in the context of 
arguments drawing on state legislation—again, often, but not always, 
in dissent.326 
 
 320. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 687–88. Chief Justice Rehnquist offered a similar analysis in Texas v. Johnson, 
using a pattern of congressional lawmaking to establish a long-standing tradition of honoring 
and protecting the flag in our nation’s law. 491 U.S. 397, 427–28 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 323. But see NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555–56 (2012) (arguing that Congress’s failure 
to regulate “inactivity” in the past cautions against upholding the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate). 
 324. Occasionally, the Supreme Court also draws on congressional expertise as expressed in 
a single piece of legislation to construe a constitutional provision or apply well-established 
doctrine. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (using Congress’s 
definition of an intangible harm to apply the “injury-in-fact” requirement of Article III standing). 
 325. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 259 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging the 
Court to look to the “evidentiary record” to “determine whether . . . [to] defer to Congress’ own 
judgments, particularly those reflecting a balance of the countervailing First Amendment 
interests” in the case); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 479 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(using congressional support for corporate campaign spending restrictions to establish a 
“longstanding consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending”); FEC v. Wis. Right 
to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 504 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing “congressional 
recognition of the ensuing threat to democratic integrity as reflected in a century of legislation 
restricting the electoral leverage of concentrations of money in corporate and union treasuries”); 
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003) (referencing “a century of congressional efforts to 
curb corporations’ potentially ‘deleterious influences on federal elections’ ”); FEC v. Nat’l Right to 
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (calling for “considerable deference” to Congress in the 
area of campaign finance); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822–23 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing long-standing congressional support for corporate campaign 
spending restrictions to justify upholding a Massachusetts law). 
 326. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 407 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (noting that he would “reconsider the question presented here 
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Other Congressional Indicators. Apart from legislation, the 
popular constitutional interpreter may look to a variety of other 
indicators, including congressional practice, Congress’s arguments 
inside the courts, and electoral mandates.  
Beginning with congressional practice, the interpreter may 
examine a long-standing congressional tradition and explore its 
relationship to key constitutional questions. Much as in the state and 
local government context, the Supreme Court has used congressional 
practice in constitutional cases.327 For instance, in Galloway, Justice 
Kennedy used the congressional practice of sectarian prayers to justify 
their use during town council meetings.328 
The Court also provided a recent—and expansive—gloss on the 
importance of congressional practice in Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning. There, while exploring the meaning 
of the word “recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause, Breyer looked 
to congressional practice—in particular, he studied how the Senate 
responded to presidential recess appointments over time.329 In the 
end, Justice Breyer used Senate practice to justify a broad reading of 
the word “recess”—one that permitted the president to make recess 
appointments in a variety of contexts.330 
Second, the popular constitutional interpreter may analyze 
Congress’s actions inside the courts—namely, the constitutional 
arguments advanced by members of Congress in key litigation, 
including amicus briefs in important constitutional cases.331 For 
instance, the Supreme Court drew attention to a congressional amicus 
brief in McDonald v. City of Chicago, with members of Congress 
arguing in favor of an individual-rights interpretation of the Second 
Amendment.332 
 
if . . . Congress” enacted related digital privacy legislation); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 
709, 754 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Stolen Valor Act represents the judgment of the 
people’s elected representatives that false statements about military awards are very different 
from false statements about civilian awards.”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 493 
(2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Congress was presented with compelling evidence that the only 
way of preventing these crimes was to target the sale of the videos.”). 
 327. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 426 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the use of the flag 
in a position of honor in government buildings). 
 328. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 579 (2014) (highlighting that Congress 
“continues to permit its . . . chaplains” to use sectarian prayers). 
 329. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 526–54 (2014) (analyzing the contours of Senate 
practice and constitutional debates, including congressional resolutions, existing laws, committee 
reports, amicus briefs submitted by leading Senators, and patterns of Senate acquiescence). 
 330. Id. at 513–14. 
 331. See Lain, supra note 30, at 1634. 
 332. 561 U.S. 742, 789 (2010). 
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Finally, the popular constitutional interpreter may look to how 
members of Congress—and their parties—seek to advance their 
constitutional visions through campaigns and speeches. For instance, 
she may examine a congressional party’s claim to a popular mandate 
for its constitutional vision following a decisive electoral victory.333 
This type of argument is not evident in Supreme Court practice, but it 
remains a topic of debate in legal scholarship and a possible form of 
argument in future cases. 
 
Conclusion. As with presidential constitutional arguments, 
those focused on Congress have their limits—especially when made in 
isolation. Congressional elections are often much less prominent than 
those for the presidency and rarely take on a constitutional 
dimension.334 Congress itself is a multimember body—making it more 
difficult than in the case of the presidency to identify a unitary 
constitutional vision. Congressional leaders are often little known, and 
Members of Congress rarely build a public following outside of their 
own constituents. Finally, when Congress acts, it often acts in raw 
political terms, not constitutional ones.335 And even then, its actions 
and inaction only imperfectly reflect the views of the American 
people.336  
These limits aside, congressional constitutional arguments may 
still help an interpreter build a broader popular constitutional 
argument. This is especially true when the interpreter is able to find 
evidence that the president, the Senate, and the House are all working 
to advance a common constitutional vision.337 
 
 333. Concededly, wave elections are rare—and wave elections with a constitutional 
dimension are even rarer. However, these elections sometimes do take on a constitutional 
dimension. See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 160–206 (exploring the Republican Party’s 
mandate following its landslide victory in the election of 1866). 
 334. See Keith Werhan, Popular Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 65, 123 (2012) (“The People’s vote for or against an incumbent would not necessarily 
express popular approval or disapproval of the myriad constitutional judgments of legislators or 
presidents in a strongly popular constitutionalist regime.”). 
 335. See id. 
 336. See Devins, supra note 40, at 1338 (“The congruence between public policy and public 
opinion is roughly sixty percent.”); Werhan, supra note 334, at 123 (noting that “the People and 
their representatives are distinct”).  
 337. See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 99–116, 149–51 (providing a powerful example of 
this sort of argument by rewriting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States and Harper v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections). 
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D. Public Opinion Polls 
When building a popular constitutional argument, the 
interpreter may draw on data from public opinion polls. Though 
controversial within constitutional practice, polls offer the popular 
constitutional interpreter a quantitative means of assessing popular 
views—and, importantly, determining whether the American people 
may have reached something approaching a consensus on a given 
constitutional issue.  
Recent polls may offer a snapshot of the American people’s 
current constitutional views, and a series of polls over time might 
capture the contours of public opinion and any patterns of 
development. For instance, consistent results across several polls over 
many years may suggest stable constitutional views. Steady increases 
or decreases in support for a given position may suggest a consistent 
trend line. And sharp changes in support may suggest a rapidly 
shifting debate. Taken together, these data offer the interpreter 
another means of determining the depth and breadth of the American 
people’s support for a given constitutional position. 
Furthermore, by studying opinion polls, the interpreter might 
identify instances in which the American people and their elected 
officials are out of alignment. For instance, Congress may pass a law 
that lacks majority support. The American people may have turned 
against a law already on the books. Or the American people may 
support a particular action, but the elected branches may not act. 
Conversely, the interpreter might strengthen her own constitutional 
argument by showing that the American people and their elected 
officials have united behind her view. 
While public opinion polls remain a controversial source of 
authority at the Supreme Court, the Justices sometimes rely on them 
as a component of their analysis in constitutional cases. The Supreme 
Court offered its most extensive treatment of public opinion polls in 
Atkins v. Virginia.338 In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens offered a 
state legislation count and national polling data as evidence of a 
popular constitutional consensus against the execution of those with 
severe mental disabilities.339 Citing a New York Times story and an 
amicus brief containing twenty state and national polls, Stevens 
concluded: 
[P]olling data shows a widespread consensus among Americans, even those who support 
the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded is wrong. Although these 
 
 338. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 339. Id. at 313–17.  
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factors are by no means dispositive, their consistency with the legislative evidence lends 
further support to our conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have 
addressed the issue.340 
Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie have also studied the well-
established use of public opinion data in the context of challenges to 
campaign finance regulations.341 In these cases, both sides often offer 
testimony from competing public opinion experts, with each side 
addressing the issue of whether there’s a relationship between 
campaign finance and public perceptions of corruption—a key 
question under campaign-finance doctrine.342 The Justices have 
sometimes drawn on these data in their opinions.343 
While public opinion polls are useful, popular constitutional 
interpreters should approach them with the requisite level of humility 
and caution.344 The interpreter should steer clear of reading too much 
into the result of any single poll on a given issue.345 She should also be 
on guard for faulty polling methodology—for instance, misleading 
questions.346 And even if the interpreter examines a range of trusted 
polls showing similar results, interpretive issues remain. Perhaps 
most importantly, the interpreter must ask whether the polling 
results represent the unreflective views of a sustained majority, or the 
American people’s considered judgments.347 To answer this key 
question, the interpreter must read public opinion data together with 
 
 340. Id. at 316 n.21 (citations omitted). 
 341. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: 
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 120–24 (2004). 
 342. Id. at 128–29. 
 343. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 461–62 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (using polling data to support her conclusion 
that states should have “leeway to ‘balance the constitutional interests in judicial integrity and 
free expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary’ ” (quoting Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 821 (2002)). 
 344. See Lain, supra note 24, at 118 (“Public-opinion-poll data can be skewed, depending on 
how questions are asked. Institutional support can reflect elite, rather than popular, opinion.”). 
 345. See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
859, 863 (2009) (“No one thinks that a court should strike down a law if, for example, more than 
50 percent (or any other number) of those who responded to a public opinion poll disapproved of 
it.”). 
 346. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 6–7 (2004); Lain, supra 
note 24, at 118 (explaining that identifying the will of the majority can be difficult because of the 
risk that opinions may change “depending on how questions are asked”); Benjamin J. Roesch, 
Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 420 (2006). Chief Justice Rehnquist highlighted many of these issues in 
his rebuke of Justice Stevens’s use of public opinion data in Atkins. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 322–28 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(calling the majority’s use of polling data “[f]eeble”). 
 347. See Roesch, supra note 346, at 404. 
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other indicators of public opinion and place those views in the context 
of broader constitutional discourse. 
Despite these risks, public opinion polls remain a valuable 
resource, and popular constitutional interpreters should not shy away 
from polling results that show sustained public support for a 
particular constitutional position over time.348 Such findings, 
especially when coupled with evidence of public engagement and 
deliberation, may serve as a key component of a powerful popular 
constitutional argument.349 
IV. CRAFTING POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
Taken together, these indicators of public opinion offer the 
popular constitutional interpreter a range of materials from which to 
build powerful popular constitutional arguments. No single indicator 
is a perfect reflection of public opinion. However, together, these 
indicators can help the interpreter determine whether the American 
people have reached a considered judgment about a given 
constitutional issue. 
In this Part, I explore ways of crafting powerful popular 
constitutional arguments from these indicators. First, I consider 
various factors that might strengthen or weaken these arguments, 
including constitutional convergence, history, deliberation, and 
interbranch custom. And second, I offer a few thoughts on the 
relationship between popular constitutionalism and precedent. 
A. Ways of Strengthening Popular Constitutional Arguments 
When crafting a popular constitutional argument, the popular 
constitutional interpreter will often combine the various indicators of 
public opinion. However, she will also look to a variety of other factors 
that might strengthen (or weaken) her argument, including 
constitutional convergence, history, deliberation, and interbranch 
custom. I consider each in turn. 
 
 348. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1227 (“But the public opinion that can 
be an input in constitutional reasoning is stable public consensus, not shifting majority 
preference.”). 
 349. See Lain, supra note 24, at 122, 135 (using Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. 
Wade as examples). 
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1. Constitutional Convergence 
When crafting a popular constitutional argument, the 
interpreter might highlight any instances of constitutional 
convergence. To that end, she will study the various strands of public 
debate over a given constitutional issue and look for any evidence of 
cross-ideological overlap in the debate. Reva Siegel350 and Bruce 
Ackerman351 both explore this dynamic and its significance to 
constitutional development. 
Social movements and political parties often mobilize around 
high-profile constitutional issues. These issues often divide the 
American people ideologically and politically, with mobilization on one 
side of the ideological spectrum leading to backlash and 
countermobilization on the other side.352 As the debate unfolds, these 
divisions often deepen. However, scholars—most notably, Siegel—
have also observed another dynamic often at work.  
These patterns of mobilization and countermobilization often 
heighten the public’s interest in the issue and spur broader debate and 
deliberation. Over time, the public debate often broadens from a small 
group of high-profile activists to the wider public. As the debate 
widens, each set of activists must address the other side’s strongest 
arguments. In the process, each side may attempt to broaden its 
appeal, co-opting some of the most popular components of the other 
side’s arguments.353 As this process unfolds, the two sides may 
converge on a certain set of constitutional baselines—broad principles 
that unite both sides, even as opponents may still divide over specific 
applications.354  
For the popular constitutional interpreter, this form of 
constitutional convergence may be strong evidence of popular 
consensus—a consensus that she may then seek to translate into 
constitutional doctrine. Examples might include constitutional 
convergence over gender equality in the 1970s and an individual-
 
 350. See Siegel, Dead, supra note 16, at 192 (“[T]his Comment shows how Heller’s 
originalism enforces understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged in the late 
twentieth century through popular constitutionalism.”); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender 
and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001) 
(“Both the ERA and the Nineteenth Amendment demonstrate how the text of the Constitution 
makes the terms of our constitutional tradition amenable to contestation by mobilized groups of 
citizens, acting inside and outside the formal procedures of the legal system.”). 
 351. E.g., 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 176, at 6 (examining Southern reactions to the Civil 
Rights Movement). 
 352. Siegel, De Facto, supra note 16, at 1362–63. 
 353. See id. at 1330–31. 
 354. See Siegel, Dead, supra note 16, at 193–94 (noting the pattern of “mobilization, 
countermobilization, coalition, and compromise”). 
Donnelly_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:19 AM 
2020] POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 135 
rights reading of the Second Amendment in the 2000s.355 In each 
instance, the Supreme Court translated constitutional convergence 
into official constitutional doctrine.356 
The popular constitutional interpreter may also look for other 
patterns in public discourse (and opinion). For example, following a 
period of extensive public debate, ideological divisions might dissolve, 
as key actors defect from one side of the debate to another. For the 
popular constitutional interpreter, this may signal that an ideological 
consensus on one side of the debate is breaking down, perhaps 
signaling a broader shift in the American people’s views. The Supreme 
Court recognized this dynamic in Lawrence v. Texas.357 As part of its 
analysis, the Court used “substantial and continuing” attacks on 
Bowers v. Hardwick by key conservative voices like Charles Fried and 
Richard Posner to signal a growing cross-ideological consensus 
condemning the criminalization of same-sex sodomy.358 
Even more powerfully, one political party may completely 
abandon a constitutional debate. For a period of time, a key 
constitutional issue—for instance, national regulation of the 
economy—may divide the two parties. The parties may run on 
competing constitutional visions over the course of a series of 
elections. They may carry out public debates on the campaign trail, in 
newspapers, and on the radio. And they might fight a series of battles 
at the Supreme Court. However, after a series of defeats—both legal 
and political—one side (or, at least, many of its mainstream leaders) 
may simply surrender, either by co-opting the popular views of its 
opponents or by simply abandoning that line of argument. A few die-
hard traditionalists may stand pat, keeping the old constitutional 
faith alive. However, a critical mass will have given up the fight, thus 
signaling the end of constitutional debate over a given issue or 
principle by the major parties. This form of acquiescence and 
consolidation plays a key role in Bruce Ackerman’s theory of 
 
 355. See Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2009) (“In my recent Comment on the decision, I read Heller as 
enforcing understandings forged in popular constitutionalism.”); Siegel, supra note 350, at 308–
13 (“[W]e might view mobilization of women for constitutional change as the source of the new 
understanding that informed judicial interpretation of the Constitution in the 1970s.”). 
 356. See Siegel, De Facto, supra note 16, at 1331, 1406 (recognizing that, in the case of the 
ERA, the debate over whether legislation was necessary to protect women’s rights provided the 
Court with apparent public agreement that women possessed rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause); Siegel, supra note 355, at 1414 n.65 (reviewing scholarly works that suggested “Heller 
would have been impossible” without the “chang[e] [in] Americans’ minds about the meaning of 
the Second Amendment” resulting from the work of organizations initiating debates on the 
topic). 
 357. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 358. Id. at 576. 
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constitutional change—for instance, when the Republican Party 
eventually accepted the New Deal.359 
While constitutional convergence may play an implicit role in 
many shifts in constitutional doctrine, we also see explicit evidence of 
constitutional convergence in the Supreme Court’s opinions. For 
instance, consider McDonnell v. United States, a recent case 
addressing allegations of corruption against the former Governor of 
Virginia and the scope of a federal anticorruption statute.360  
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court.361 As part of his analysis of the statute, he relied on 
constitutional convergence in two instances. First, Roberts quoted a 
bipartisan amicus brief filed by former White House counsel who 
served both parties: “White House counsel who worked in every 
administration from that of President Reagan to President Obama 
warn that the Government’s ‘breathtaking expansion of public-
corruption law would likely chill federal officials’ interactions with the 
people they serve and thus damage their ability effectively to perform 
their duties.’ ”362 Second, he cited bipartisan briefs from state 
attorneys general offering additional support, explicitly highlighting 
the party breakdown for each brief: “Six former Virginia attorneys 
general—four Democrats and two Republicans—also filed an amicus 
brief in this Court echoing those concerns, as did 77 former state 
attorneys general from States other than Virginia—41 Democrats, 35 
Republicans, and 1 independent.”363 A unanimous Supreme Court 
ultimately followed the advice offered in these bipartisan briefs and 
read the statute narrowly. 
The Court also turns to constitutional convergence when 
analyzing congressional action. For some Justices, bipartisan support 
increases the legitimacy of a given statute and strengthens its claim to 
speak for an underlying popular constitutional consensus. For 
instance, Chief Justice Warren used constitutional convergence as 
part of his argument in Katzenbach, stressing the “overwhelming,” 
bipartisan votes in favor of the Voting Rights Act.364 Justice Ginsburg 
made similar arguments in her Shelby County dissent.365 
 
 359. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 178, at 255–311. 
 360. 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2357–58 (2016). 
 361. Id. at 2360. 
 362. Id. at 2372. 
 363. Id. 
 364. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308–09, 315 (1966). 
 365. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 593 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing 
the “bipartisan” support for the Voting Rights Act’s reauthorization in 2006 and quoting the 
Republican House Judiciary Committee Chair, James Sensenbrenner, as a key supporter). 
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Finally, we also see constitutional convergence frequently in 
legal practice before the Supreme Court. With the rise of Supreme 
Court amicus briefs,366 litigants look for ways to stand out from the 
avalanche of other filings. In our polarized age, one of the best ways to 
signal the legitimacy of one’s constitutional position is through filing a 
“strange bedfellows” brief—one that brings together groups, scholars, 
government officials, or elected officials from across the ideological 
spectrum. We saw an example of the power of this move in Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion in McDonnell. There are many examples of 
these filings in a range of other areas in recent years, including 
marriage equality367 and the Affordable Care Act.368 
In the end, by studying constitutional convergence and 
divergence—evidence of social movement activity, political 
mobilization, and wider public debate—the popular constitutional 
interpreter can gain a better understanding of the depth and breadth 
of support for a given constitutional judgment. By examining these 
dynamics, the interpreter can either strengthen or weaken her 
popular constitutional argument. 
2. History 
The interpreter may draw on history to strengthen her popular 
constitutional argument—whether through historical narrative, 
polling patterns, or trends in state legislation on the books. By turning 
to history, the interpreter might establish the durability of a given 
popular constitutional consensus. While some areas of consensus may 
have formed recently (e.g., support for LGBT rights), others might 
have a longer historical pedigree (e.g., support for regulating corporate 
campaign spending). Historical argument allows the popular 
constitutional interpreter to add this time element to her argument. 
The Justices often turn to this combination of popular opinion 
and history. For instance, Justice Stevens drew on history to build a 
powerful popular constitutional argument in his Citizens United 
 
 366. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on 
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 744 (2000) (“In recent years, one or more amicus 
briefs have been filed in 85% of the Court’s argued cases.”). 
 367. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Republicans Sign Brief in Support of Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/us/politics/prominent-republicans-
sign-brief-in-support-of-gay-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/V4Q2-BZDY] (using briefs signed by 
Republicans in Obergefell to describe a growing bipartisan consensus around marriage equality). 
 368. See Jonathan H. Adler & Abbe R. Gluck, What the Lawless Obamacare Ruling Means, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/opinion/obamacare-ruling-
unconstitutional-affordable-care-act.html [https://perma.cc/YZX2-4DBX] (describing a brief 
signed by scholars from across the ideological spectrum opposing a recent ruling attacking the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
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dissent. There, Stevens argued that the Court should uphold federal 
restrictions on corporate campaign spending.369 To support this 
conclusion, he highlighted support for such regulations in Congress 
and in “half the state legislatures . . . over many decades”—combining 
congressional action, state legislation counting, and history.370 Stevens 
also ended his dissent with a powerful popular constitutional 
narrative, again drawing on history: 
At bottom, the Court’s opinion is . . . a rejection of the common sense of the American 
people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self-
government since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting 
potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange 
time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few 
outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of 
corporate money in politics.371 
Stevens used public opinion and history to reinforce the set of 
traditional constitutional arguments made throughout the rest of his 
dissent.372 
In the end, by turning to history, the popular constitutional 
interpreter can gain a better understanding of the durability (or 
novelty) of a given constitutional judgment. Depending on the 
findings, this move may either strengthen or weaken the interpreter’s 
popular constitutional argument. 
3. Deliberation 
Constitutional scholars have long argued that the Framers—
and James Madison, in particular—designed our constitutional 
system to promote deliberative democracy.373 For constitutional 
scholars, these deliberative values often tie back to Madison’s vision 
for our constitutional system—with the public and its leaders debating 
the most important issues facing the nation, public opinion reflecting 
reason (not passion or partisan interest), and these refined views, in 
turn, shaping policy.374 This strand of constitutional thought is 
 
 369. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 393–480 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 370. Id. at 421 n.46. 
 371. Id. at 479. 
 372. Chief Justice Rehnquist made a similar move in Texas v. Johnson. 491 U.S. 397, 426–27 
(1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (using the historic symbolism of the American flag to support 
his argument that prohibiting the public burning of the flag does not violate the First 
Amendment). 
 373. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 19–20 (1993) (“[T]he American 
Constitution was designed to create a deliberative democracy.”). 
 374. See, e.g., Colleen A. Sheehan, The Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison’s “Notes on 
Government,” 49 WM. & MARY Q. 609, 625 (1992) (arguing that Madison envisioned a 
constitutional system guided by public opinion, but not simply immediate opinion or the 
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important to popular constitutionalism and is reflected in Larry 
Kramer’s influential account.375 
For popular constitutional argument, interpreters may study 
the public debate surrounding an issue to determine whether it has 
been a topic of ongoing debate and deliberation among the American 
people and their political leaders—or not. On the one hand, if the 
American people have engaged the issue over time, then the 
interpreter can be more confident that the public’s views reflect some 
level of thought and debate. This analysis might support popular 
constitutional action if this deliberation has led to a consensus, or 
inaction if the public remains divided and debate persists. On the 
other hand, if the public has not debated the issue over time, then 
there is the danger that any public opinion indicators are merely an 
unreflective (or unrepresentative) snapshot of the public’s view. 
The Justices often use deliberation to either strengthen their 
own affirmative popular constitutional argument or expose their 
opponents’ position as an elitist attempt to shut down debate and 
impose the views of unelected judges on the American people.376 For 
instance, in Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked 
to debates in state legislatures to reject a constitutional right to die. 
He stressed the deliberative process in the states, explaining that 
state laws touching on a right to die had been “reexamined and, 
generally, reaffirmed” in “recent years.”377 He also noted that the 
states were still “engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of 
physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues.”378 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist feared that a Supreme Court ruling in favor of a 
 
preferences of a “factious majority”); Colleen A. Sheehan, Public Opinion and the Formation of 
Civic Character in Madison’s Republican Theory, 67 REV. POL. 37, 45 (2005) (describing how the 
Framers’ complex system would open up space for a public debate guided by political leaders). 
Madison explains this view well in The Federalist. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James 
Madison) (explaining that the American constitutional system would “refine and enlarge the 
public’s views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom 
may best discern the interest of their country”). 
 375. Kramer, supra note 35, at 748. 
 376. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 564–65 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing Congress’s “conscientious[ ]” study of the problem of voter discrimination); Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002) (“[T]he American public, legislators, scholars, and judges 
have deliberated over the question whether the death penalty should ever be imposed on a 
mentally retarded criminal. The consensus reflected in those deliberations informs our answer to 
the question presented by this case.”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308–09, 315 
(1966) (highlighting the extensiveness of the hearings and the “voluminous legislative history” 
underlying the VRA). 
 377. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716 (1997). 
 378. Id. at 719. 
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constitutional right to die would short-circuit this deliberative process 
and “strike down the considered policy choice of almost every state.”379 
In the end, by turning to deliberation, the popular 
constitutional interpreter can gain a better understanding of the 
amount of public debate underlying popular views on a given 
constitutional issue. Depending on the findings, this turn to 
deliberation may either strengthen or weaken the interpreter’s 
popular constitutional claim. 
4. Interbranch Custom 
The popular constitutional interpreter may look to interbranch 
custom to strengthen her popular constitutional argument. 
Interbranch custom refers to instances in which the president and 
Congress have settled on a practice that gives life to a particular 
constitutional provision. These patterns of action by the elected 
branches have proven especially useful in the separation of powers 
context—an area in which the Supreme Court has often been 
reluctant to adjudicate disputes between two coequal branches of 
government. By turning to interbranch custom, the popular 
constitutional interpreter might draw authority from the democratic 
legitimacy of the people’s elected representatives and their 
constitutional authority as officials who have taken an oath to support 
the Constitution.380 
This approach has a strong historical pedigree—both in 
constitutional theory and in Supreme Court practice. For instance, in 
the early twentieth century, Karl Llewellyn valued governmental 
practice over the Constitution’s text, arguing that “it is only the 
practice which can legitimatize the words as being still part of our 
going Constitution.”381 Turning to Supreme Court decisionmaking, 
Llewellyn added, “Established executive, administrative or legislative 
practice the Court merely accepts.”382 
In Canning, Justice Breyer offers the most thorough defense—
and the most extensive example—of the Supreme Court’s use of 
interbranch custom in recent years. As he explains, “[W]e interpret 
the Constitution in light of its text, purposes, and ‘our whole 
experience’ as a Nation. And we look to the actual practice of 
Government to inform our interpretation.”383 
 
 379. Id. at 723 (emphasis added). 
 380. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 381. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1934). 
 382. Id. at 31. 
 383. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014) (citation omitted).  
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Justice Breyer links this method back to two of the most 
important constitutional figures in the early republic—James Madison 
and John Marshall. Beginning with Madison, Justice Breyer draws on 
Madison’s reflections on how interpreters might use governmental 
practice to settle the Constitution’s meaning over time: 
As James Madison wrote, it “was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that 
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding [the] terms 
& phrases necessarily used in [the] charter . . . and that it might require a regular 
course of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”384  
Madison’s vision is central to Justice Breyer’s approach to interbranch 
custom in Canning. 
Justice Breyer also turns to Chief Justice Marshall and a 
canonical case, McCulloch v. Maryland, for constitutional authority. 
Consistent with Madison’s insight, Marshall called on judges to rely 
on governmental practice to help settle constitutional disputes: 
[A] doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause, and the human judgment 
be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are not concerned, 
but the respective powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are 
to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a 
considerable impression from that practice.385 
In Canning, Justice Breyer instructs interpreters to first 
analyze the Constitution’s text. If the text is dispositive, then that is 
the end of the inquiry. However, if the text is susceptible to multiple 
readings, then the interpreter might refer to interbranch custom to 
help settle the constitutional dispute. After analyzing the 
Constitution’s text, Justice Breyer concludes that the Recess 
Appointments Clause is ambiguous and then uses interbranch custom 
to help determine its meaning and scope.386 We reviewed parts of 
Justice Breyer’s analysis in Section III.B—an analysis that draws on 
presidential practice, Senate acquiescence, and legal arguments (and 
actions) by both branches.  
In the end, Justice Breyer reads the use of the word “recess” 
broadly, permitting recess appointments during intrasession recesses 
and for vacancies that arise while the Congress is still in session.387 
However, he also concedes that he may have reached a different 
conclusion if he had ignored interbranch custom and relied on the 
 
 384. Id. at 525 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908)); see also William Baude, 
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
 385. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819). 
 386. Canning, 573 U.S. at 527–28. 
 387. Id. at 538. 
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Constitution’s text alone.388 For Justice Breyer, interbranch custom 
has real interpretive bite. 
In the end, by considering interbranch custom, the popular 
constitutional interpreter can focus on instances in which the elected 
branches have reached a constitutional settlement on the application 
of the Constitution’s text. Of course, interbranch custom has its 
limitations. Custom may reflect genuine agreement between the 
branches. However, congressional acquiescence does not always mean 
that a congressional majority supports a presidential practice. Even 
when a position has majority support, Congress often has difficulty 
acting—whether because of a crowded agenda, the institution’s veto 
gates, or a mere preference for constitutional shirking.389 
Nevertheless, when the interpreter identifies evidence that the 
elected branches have reached a constitutional settlement, she might 
draw on this settlement to strengthen her popular constitutional 
argument. And conversely, interbranch conflict might undermine any 
claims of a popular constitutional consensus. 
B. Precedent and Popular Constitutionalism 
Finally, a quick word on precedent. A new popular 
constitutional consensus may push courts down a new doctrinal 
path—breathing new life into an old constitutional provision, 
identifying a new fundamental right, or closing off a line of precedent. 
However, the popular mandate giving life to this new construction is 
but the beginning of an unfolding legal process, as courts attempt to 
translate that popular constitutional understanding into doctrine. In 
this sense, popular constitutional consensus may set a new agenda—
an individual-rights reading of the Second Amendment, for instance—
but then it is up to the courts to construct a doctrine to implement 
that new value in the courts. 
Popular constitutional judges looking to start down a new 
doctrinal path should be conscious of their place in the constitutional 
life cycle. When beginning to shift constitutional doctrine in a new 
direction, such a judge should issue minimalist decisions tightly 
linked to the facts of a given case and the specifics of the 
constitutional consensus that has crystallized around it.390 Such 
 
 388. Id. at 527. 
 389. Even Justice Breyer conceded as much. Id. at 532. 
 390. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 61–72 (1999) (explaining that this practice allows continued public debate on the broader 
topic); Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977, 1982–83 (2006) 
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rulings should clearly leave open the possibility of future doctrinal 
developments and ongoing democratic deliberation.391  
This kind of approach would allow for easy midcourse 
corrections in the face of public backlash392 and, therefore, guard 
against moving too far, too fast based on a single reading of public 
consensus on a given issue.393 This would also permit additional 
debate among legal elites, judges, elected officials, and the American 
people, as new cases in the lower courts and additional social 
mobilization further focus the public’s attention, heighten public 
engagement, and clarify any practical implications of the new 
construction.394  
In the end, the popular constitutional judge should approach 
shifts in constitutional doctrine with caution.395 She should pause 
before recognizing a new constitutional consensus about a given issue, 
limit the early wave of cases to their specific facts and to paradigmatic 
applications of the new construction, and leave doctrinal room for 
backtracking in the face of public outrage. 
V. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT—A CASE STUDY: 
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES AND MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
To see how popular constitutional argument might work in a 
recent case, I end by contrasting the reasoning in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges396 with how a popular constitutional 
interpreter might have addressed marriage equality. Scholars are no 
doubt right that public opinion writ large influenced the Justices on 
 
(describing the different ways that a constitutional provision may apply to a set of facts 
depending on the analysis used by the Court). 
 391. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 390, at 24–45, 61–72 (outlining the connection between 
minimalism and democracy); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 14, 99 (1996) (“Minimalist judges try to keep their judgments as narrow and as 
incompletely theorized as possible.”). 
 392. See Amar, supra note 52, at 1782 (“If judges may properly strike down highly unusual 
state (or even federal) laws . . . will government innovation and experimentation be unduly 
stifled . . . ? Not if the judges proceed with caution and humility . . . .”). 
 393. See Coan, supra note 12, at 238 (asserting that judges should practice “judicial 
restraint” when deciding cases based on public outrage); Strauss, supra note 345, at 868–69 
(explaining how Furman’s decision that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied may 
have been attributed to diminishing public support for capital punishment, which was later 
revitalized as states enacted new death penalty statutes). 
 394. See Lain, supra note 24, at 183 (asserting that, even if the Court reaches the wrong 
decision in a case, this may “forc[e] public debate over contested constitutional questions”); 
Sunstein, supra note 391, at 99 (stating that minimalism helps to “maximize the space for 
democratic deliberation about basic political and moral issues”). 
 395. See Amar, supra note 52, at 1782. 
 396. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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this issue,397 but the opinion itself—its reasoning and its craft—can 
also be analyzed from a popular constitutional perspective, especially 
when placed in dialogue with Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent.  
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision striking 
down state same-sex marriage bans.398 Justice Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion in the case, and it combines traditional legal analysis 
with Justice Kennedy’s usual commitment to “dignity” and “liberty.”399 
However, he does strike some popular constitutional notes as part of 
his analysis, drawing on traditional forms of popular constitutional 
argument. 
For instance, he relies on indicators of state lawmaking and 
practice. Beginning with state legislation, Justice Kennedy collects 
“State Legislation . . . Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage” in an Appendix 
to his Obergefell opinion.400 However, the Appendix lists only twelve 
laws, which suggests the weakness of his state constitutional 
argument.401 
Justice Kennedy also uses examples of state lawmaking and 
practice to reinforce his own constitutional conclusions—in many 
cases, using state actions to establish constitutionally relevant facts. 
For instance, Justice Kennedy uses state adoption laws as “powerful 
confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create 
loving, supportive families.”402 He similarly argues that state laws 
providing benefits to married couples “have contributed to the 
fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that 
institution at the center of so many facets of the legal and social 
order.”403 Given this treatment of marriage by the states, when states 
exclude same-sex couples from the institution, they “impose stigma 
and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”404 
Justice Kennedy also draws on historical narrative to place the 
debate over marriage equality in context. In the process, he offers an 
account of the LGBT rights movement that builds on that social 
movement’s history and highlights the extent to which the issue of 
marriage equality has been the topic of public debate for years—a 
fusion of history and deliberation that strengthens the popular 
 
 397. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17–93 (2016) (describing the history of the fight for legality of same-sex 
marriage in the United States). 
 398. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 399. Id. at 2585. 
 400. Id. at 2611 app. B. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at 2600. 
 403. Id. at 2601. 
 404. Id. at 2602. 
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constitutional dimensions of his opinion.405 The main thrust of Justice 
Kennedy’s narrative is clear: there has been an undeniable trend in 
favor of LGBT rights (and marriage equality) over time. And some of 
his most powerful passages use deliberative argument—passages that 
show that key changes in society, politics, and law reflected a national 
debate over LGBT rights and marriage equality. In the process, 
Justice Kennedy explicitly ties arguments made at the Supreme Court 
to the insights gleaned from these debates.406 
Justice Kennedy links the legitimacy of constitutional change 
(and the recognition of new rights) to changes in society-wide public 
opinion—a classic popular constitutional move. He observes: “[R]ights 
come not from ancient sources alone. They arise, too, from a better 
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a 
liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”407 Justice Kennedy adds, 
“[I]n interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has 
recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal 
unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that 
once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”408 It is the Court’s duty to 
“[r]espond to” this “new awareness.”409  
Despite these strong gestures towards popular constitutional 
argument, Justice Kennedy is ultimately fuzzy on how the Court 
should go about recognizing “new insights and societal 
understandings.”410 In the end, he returns to judicial authority and 
argues that the Court must ultimately exercise its own independent 
judgment—shaped by “new insights” gleaned by the current 
generation, but ultimately settled by the independent legal reasoning 
of judges “in the formal discourse of the law.”411 For instance, stressing 
the Court’s countermajoritarian mission, Justice Kennedy explains, “It 
is of no moment whether advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or 
lack momentum in the democratic process. The issue before the Court 
here is the legal question whether the Constitution protects the right 
of same-sex couples to marry.”412 In the end, Justice Kennedy’s vision 
risks leaving judges—not the American people—in the drivers’ seat. 
 
 405. Id. at 2595–97. 
 406. Id. at 2605 (using powerful language to highlight the extent of the debate over marriage 
equality). 
 407. Id. at 2602. 
 408. Id. at 2603. 
 409. See id. at 2604. 
 410. Id. at 2603.  
 411. Id. at 2588. 
 412. Id. at 2606 (emphasis added). 
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This countermajoritarian turn leaves Justice Kennedy 
vulnerable to attack on multiple fronts, including key popular 
constitutional fronts, even as Justice Kennedy could easily lay claim to 
enforcing a newly emerging popular constitutional consensus. Chief 
Justice Roberts exploits this opening, in a dissent that ties a call for 
judicial restraint to many strands of popular constitutional 
argument.413 
For instance, Chief Justice Roberts strikes many popular 
constitutional chords in the following passage—one of his most 
powerful—combining deliberative argument, state legislation 
counting, history, and the dangers of judicial supremacy: 
Supporters of same-sex marriage have achieved considerable success persuading their 
fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their view. That ends today. 
Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted their own vision of marriage as a 
matter of constitutional law. . . . [T]he Court invalidates the marriage laws of more than 
half the States and orders the transformation of a social institution that has formed the 
basis of human society for millennia . . . . Just who do we think we are?414  
Throughout his dissent, the Chief Justice also references public 
opinion,415 acknowledges ongoing public debate,416 draws on state 
legislation counting,417 and places these state legislation counts in the 
context of a broader history of limiting marriage to a man and a 
woman throughout American history.418 
While the Chief Justice’s dissent ultimately turns on other 
factors—namely, his conclusion that the Constitution does not speak 
to marriage equality—it often reads like a constitutional law lesson for 
lawyers, law students, and ordinary citizens, linking Obergefell to 
previous instances of judicial overreach like Lochner.419 Justice 
Kennedy’s emphasis on countermajoritarian reasoning and 
independent legal judgment play into the Chief Justice’s hands—
strengthening this attack.  
To be clear, the Chief Justice’s popular constitutional 
arguments are, themselves, open to popular constitutional 
counterarguments. While Justice Kennedy makes an easy target for a 
 
 413. Id. at 2611–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 414. Id. at 2611–12. 
 415. Id. at 2615 (“Over the last few years, public opinion on marriage has shifted rapidly.”). 
 416. Id. at 2624–25 (praising the debate over marriage equality). 
 417. Id. at 2614, 2615, 2626. 
 418. Id. at 2614 (“There is no dispute that every State at the founding—and every State 
throughout our history until a dozen years ago—defined marriage in the traditional, biologically 
rooted way.”). 
 419. Id. at 2615–16 (“In reality . . . the majority’s approach has no basis in principle or 
tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that characterized 
discredited decisions such as Lochner . . .”); see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
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Lochnerizing assault, popular constitutional argument offers a 
principled response to the Chief Justice—one tied to concrete 
indicators of public opinion, not a judge’s own independent moral 
judgments. 
For instance, the Chief Justice’s dissent leaves the impression 
that the Supreme Court was imposing an unpopular opinion on the 
American people—and Justice Kennedy left himself susceptible to that 
argument by stressing his use of independent legal reasoning. 
However, even if Chief Justice Roberts is right that the Constitution 
does not speak on the issue,420 and that, therefore, there is no judicial 
role here except for deference—it is simply not true that the Court was 
imposing an unpopular decision on the American people. Public 
opinion evidence demonstrated majority support for marriage equality 
and tracking polls suggested a strengthening trend in that 
direction.421 
Or, take the issue of unenumerated rights. Chief Justice 
Roberts is right that there is “no ‘Companionship and Understanding’ 
or ‘Nobility and Dignity’ Clause in the Constitution.”422 He is also 
right to warn about the dangers of unconstrained judicial 
policymaking—that “[a]llowing unelected judges to select which 
unenumerated rights rank as ‘fundamental’ . . . raises obvious 
concerns about the judicial role.”423 However, popular constitutional 
argument provides concrete indicators for discerning public opinion. 
Furthermore, the Constitution’s text—namely, the Ninth Amendment 
and the Fourteenth Amendment—may provide a warrant for 
protecting rights actually deemed fundamental by the American 
people even if they are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 
Finally, while Roberts suggests that Glucksberg and its focus on 
history and tradition is the best approach to unenumerated rights,424 
popular constitutional argument offers an alternative—one that 
provides the Justices with a means of tying the recognition of a new 
right to the commands of the American people. 
 
 420. And he’s not. 
 421. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-
rights.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XS52-WCGR] (showing majority support 
(sixty-one percent) for marriage equality in 2016—rising to sixty-seven percent by 2018). 
 422. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 423. See also id. (“[A] Justice’s commission does not confer any specific moral, philosophical, 
or social insight sufficient to justify imposing those perceptions on fellow citizens under the 
pretense of ‘due process.’ ”). 
 424. Id. at 2622–23 (“The purpose of insisting that implied fundamental rights have roots in 
the history and tradition of our people is to ensure that when unelected judges strike down 
democratically enacted laws, they do so based on something more than their own beliefs . . . .”). 
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Of course, different popular constitutional interpreters might 
have reached different conclusions in Obergefell. For those 
interpreters joining Justice Kennedy in striking down same-sex 
marriage bans, they might emphasize public opinion data showing 
majority support for marriage equality, trends in public opinion 
reinforcing that result (with support continuing to grow), and evidence 
of a crumbling consensus against marriage equality, with marriage 
equality becoming orthodoxy on the political left and increasing 
support for marriage equality even among some establishment figures 
on the political right.  
Some popular constitutional interpreters may have been open 
to upholding same-sex marriage bans when they clearly divided the 
public and there was strong (and unified) support for these bans on 
the right. However, with this support weakening and a bipartisan 
consensus in opposition emerging, they might have become more open 
to striking these bans down—perhaps combining some of the tools of 
popular constitutional argument with other constitutional modalities 
to reach that conclusion.425 Still others might have excluded cases 
involving alleged discrimination against minorities from popular 
constitutional analysis altogether and instead might have looked to 
other constitutional arguments to resolve this case. 
Finally, for those interpreters joining the dissenters in 
upholding the same-sex marriage bans, they might have looked at 
many of the same indicators of public opinion highlighted by Chief 
Justice Roberts and concluded that the debate is still ongoing. From 
this perspective, neither side has secured a sustained, cross-
ideological consensus. Therefore, these interpreters might have simply 
deferred to the elected branches, allowed a diversity of approaches at 
the state level, and permitted the debate to go on.  
As with any constitutional methodology, popular constitutional 
argument does not dictate any particular outcome in a given case. 
Nevertheless, the indicators of public opinion may provide a 
framework for assessing whether popular constitutional argument has 
any force. 
CONCLUSION 
Popular constitutionalism—as a matter of both theory and 
practice—remains a work in progress. In this Article, I have sought to 
 
 425. See Primus, Public Consensus, supra note 12, at 1228 (suggesting that “the content of 
equal protection shifted as public opinion moved away from a once-solid consensus dismissing 
the possibility of same-sex marriage”). 
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provide a framework for understanding the role that popular 
constitutional consensus might play inside the courts. In the process, I 
have explored the relationship between popular constitutional 
argument, the existing popular constitutionalism literature, and long-
standing debates in constitutional theory. And I have sought to offer 
the interpreter a concrete framework for crafting popular 
constitutional arguments—cataloguing various indicators of public 
opinion and offering examples of how to use popular constitutional 
analysis to address today’s constitutional questions.  
While this Article makes a start, much work remains. 
